Citizen voice and state accountability

Towards theories of change that embrace contextual dynamics

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advancing knowledge, shaping policy, inspiring practice

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Acronyms

ADC	Area Development Committee
AIIM	Alignment, Interest and Influence Matrix
CBPM	Community-based Performance Monitoring
CDF	Constituency Development Fund
CIN	Christian Information Network
CODI	Community Development and Child Welfare Initiatives
CRC	Citizen Report Card
CRU	Conflict Research Unit
CSC	Community Score Card
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CV&A	Citizen Voice and Accountability
DDC	District Development Committee
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DHO	District Health Officer
DRT	Development Training and Research
GDA	Gurage Development Association
GTF	Governance and Transparency Fund
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
LC	Local Council
LDF	Local Development Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MADEN	Masindi District Education Network
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OC	Outcome Challenge
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OM	Outcome Mapping
ORS	Organizational Research Services
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PM	Progress Marker
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTSA	Parents Teachers and Students Association
RLC	Radio Listening Club
SGACA	Strategic Governance and Anti-corruption Assessment
SMC	School Management Committee
TAI	Transparency and Accountability Initiative
ToC	Theory of Change
UK	United Kingdom
V&A	Voice and Accountability
VDC	Village Development Committee
WGA	World Governance Assessment
WGI	World Governance Index
WIP	Well-informed Person

Executive summary

> 'Our bargain with taxpayers is this: in return for contributing your hard-earned money to helping the world's poorest people, it is our duty to spend every penny of aid effectively. My top priority will be to secure maximum value for money in aid through greater transparency, rigorous independent evaluation and an unremitting focus on results' Andrew Mitchell, UK Secretary of State for International Development, Speech delivered on 12 May 2010.

Development practice is increasingly being pushed to achieve results as well as to explain clearly 'what works or does not work and under what circumstances' on the path to achieving such results. Therefore, while putting an 'unremitting focus on results', as Andrew Mitchell says, development practitioners are now also investing increasingly in understanding the factors that shape results, positive or otherwise. The shift to this way of working could be explained partly as being a result of a need to achieve more efficiency in the use of increasingly scarce aid resources, especially in the context of the global financial crisis. It might also reflect concerns of the general impasse around aid and its results among development professionals themselves. There is particular concern regarding the ways individual cases of success can be scaled up to other contexts so that broad-based national economic growth and development or poverty reduction objectives can be achieved.

Making theories of change (ToCs) explicit right from the start of development projects[1] can help in discovering what will need to happen in order to get from 'here' to 'there'. In this case, the 'here' is the prevailing undesired situation and the 'there' is the intended development outcome or result in the short, medium and long term. Exploring ToCs should also become a central part of 'rigorous independent evaluations' and of ascertaining the effectiveness and impacts of development interventions. In other words, good ToCs will enhance the rigour of evaluations from the beginning of an intervention process and not just at the end of a development programme.

However, when current approaches to articulating and representing ToCs are applied to citizen voice and accountability (CV&A) programmes and projects, programme managers find that realities are more complex and dynamic than can be captured with the tools they have at hand. This is because these realities comprise ongoing state–citizen relations involving a wide range of different actors who pursue their aims according to different interests and incentives. These relations are, in themselves, a complex web of formal and informal interactions that are difficult to disentangle and explain. This complexity increases even further when the multiple external relations, interests and influences in the specific state–citizen relations targeted in CV&A projects are taken into account. All these internal and external relations mean that CV&A project interventions produce and reproduce diverse outcomes which are not amenable to the linear models of ToCs.

In this paper, we provide a critical analysis of a series of CV&A cases from the Mwananchi Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) programme[2] in order to develop some patterns of observation and thought lines which, when put together, form an analytical framework for developing ToCs for CV&A projects. The analytical framework focuses attention on how to explore, understand and explain change as it occurs in a dynamic context, and then how this can help in the formation of more realistic CV&A objectives and the resultant outcomes. It provides CV&A programme teams with a way of navigating various context-dependent dynamics of citizen-state engagement in order to achieve intermediate outcomes such as changes in policies and practice (e.g. increased access to better public services for poor citizens). Most programme teams also aim to have these intermediate outcomes contribute to

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[1] The word 'project' here is used in a generic sense to refer to any deliberate external intervention that has a particular social change objective, is time-bound and is resourced in a particular way to achieve the intended aims. We deliberately use the words 'programme' and 'project' interchangeably in this paper.
[2] The GTF is a one-off funding mechanism created by the UK Department for International Development as part of its implementation of the 2006 White Paper on 'Making Governance Work for Poor People', focusing on the grassroots end of political governance in working with media, civil society organisations (CSOs), trade unions etc.

long term impacts such as inclusive growth and development, reduction in corruption and improved quality of leaders within government and society.

It is envisaged that, in working with this analytical framework, programme teams will be able to enter into an ongoing learning cycle based on an ongoing process of analysis, intervening and learning on a path to get from 'here' to 'there'. It is hoped that each succeeding cycle of learning will produce better results than the preceding one, as positive experiences are replicated and retested. In terms of policy-makers or organisations whose primary focus is on influencing policy change, this approach can help them to generate better evidence for influencing policies. For donors, the analytical approach might lead to identifying effective mechanisms of supporting social accountability initiatives in different contexts.

In developing this analytical framework, we draw on the principles of the well-known approaches of outcome mapping (OM) and political economy analysis (PEA). In their current forms, these approaches are used independently and for different purposes. However, through the action research process of the Mwananchi programme, we found a particular way of fusing relevant elements of PEA and OM in order to inform the evolution of ToCs for CV&A programmes. The central idea of the paper is to explain this fusion of PEA and OM in deepening analysis and hence understanding of the ongoing dynamics within citizen–state interactions; and of the influences of the wider context on these interactions. It is also about explaining how we can systematically identify and understand the 'game-changers' in these dynamics and how their context-dependent behaviour could be influenced in order to make the desired CV&A change happen. The paper seeks to achieve these aims with real CV&A programme teams and projects in mind.

1. Introduction

This paper puts forward a model for developing theories of change (ToCs) that are better grounded in dynamic socioeconomic and political contexts. In order to do so, it suggests an analytical approach which might be useful for understanding contextual dynamics and inform the mapping of citizen voice and accountability (CV&A) outcomes[3]. It is envisaged that the ongoing mapping of the contexts in which interventions are taking place will improve ToCs, which will in turn result in better results. Political economy analysis[4] (PEA) is suggested as a tool to understand context, and outcome mapping (OM) for mapping out more realistic outcomes, informed by PEA: the two tools are linked in a logical and analytical way in order to maximise on their inherent strengths. However, the focus is still on developing a better understanding of CV&A change processes in terms of what works and under what circumstances, rather than on the tools *per se*.

ToCs are more important at this point in the development trajectory than ever before. The development industry is increasingly pushing practitioners to achieve results, and also to get better at explaining and demonstrating what works or does not work and under what circumstances on the path to achieving immediate, intermediate and long-term outcomes. There is a growing interest in going beyond measuring results to being able to understand what enables particular results to be achieved or not. Making the ToCs[5] that underlie particular interventions explicit is meant to help in this process.

1.1 Relationship between ToCs and logical models

In simple terms, a ToC is a conceptual map showing how programme or project teams think they can get from where things are to their desired end. As such, they focus much more on the 'how' and 'why' questions, thereby forcing programme teams to reveal their underlying assumptions. This is unlike logical models (such as logical frameworks), which aim to show stakeholders the main programme components at a glance as well as the logical relationships among them: showing these logical relationships does not articulate why the programme team believes these will work, as opposed to alternative sets of 'inputs-activities–outputs-outcomes' links.

ToCs, much more than logical models, draw their strength from the world views programme teams have of the change process (from years of research or implementing similar projects, for instance) and how they therefore see what might happen in future. The problem is that programme teams tend not to read into contexts and their dynamics well enough, and therefore develop ill-suited ToCs. This paper seeks to contribute towards addressing this challenge. Ultimately, logical frameworks that draw on well-developed ToCs will be better at helping programme teams to manage projects with clear results and indicators of change.

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[3]CV&A outcomes are the main objective for different types of social accountability initiatives. The term 'social accountability' encompasses "the wide range of citizen and civil society organization (CSO) actions to hold the state to account, as well as actions on the part of government, media, and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts (McNeil and Malena, 2010, p.1).

[4] PEA aims to situate development interventions within an understanding of the prevailing political and economic processes in society—**specifically the incentives, relationships, distribution and contestation of power between different groups and individuals**—all of which greatly impact on development outcomes (www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis, emphasis added). It helps in understanding interests and incentives and how they give rise to outcomes that might enhance or hinder change, how formal and informal rules of the game influence interactions and competition and the impact of values and ideas (political ideologies, cultural beliefs and faith) on political behaviour and policy processes (DFID, 2009: 4).

[5] Funnell and Rogers distinguish between 'theory of change' and 'theory of action', the former being defined as 'the central processes or drivers by which change comes about for individuals, groups, or communities' and the later as 'the ways in which programs or other interventions are constructed to activate these theories of change' (2011: 34). According to this view, ToCs and theories of action, when taken together, form a 'programme theory'.

1.2   The nature of ToCs in CV&A programmes

The changes involved in CV&A are very complex and dynamic, because they involve webs of relationships among citizens and with state actors. Again, ToCs can be useful here in laying down what the project design team and other stakeholders know at the time and clarifying their assumptions about what will have to happen in order to achieve the ultimate desired change. The design team and stakeholders will factor in the uncertainties of the future, coupled with the complexity of relationships and influencing factors as far as they know at the time of planning, from research or other experiences they have brought together. At the same time, they need to be ready to subject this knowledge and these initial assumptions to critical examination when the reality unfolds—as this could play out very differently from what the programme team thought would be the case at the outset.

In thinking retrospectively, ToCs help programme managing teams and stakeholders to reflect systematically on what has actually happened as a result of interventions, with a view to identifying which practices are good and hence can be replicated, in which kinds of operational contexts, and how to go about promoting practices that are proven to work well. This would, by extension, make it possible to achieve the intended development goals more quickly, economically and efficiently. Furthermore, ToCs can enable learning from 'failure', 'partial success' and 'success' (Funnell and Rogers, 2011). Explicit ToCs therefore provide programme managers with a robust approach to analysing and explaining results of their programme efforts along the way.

In essence, a strong retrospective analysis built into a programme based on the main question 'how did we get here?', and developing tools to answer this question using a robust evidence trail, could form a better basis for developing ToCs for complex issues. This is as opposed to the current emphasis on grand, and often theoretical, design frameworks that are frequently devoid of practical relevance to the contexts in which they are to be applied. Nevertheless, even in the case of inbuilt retrospective analysis, what is being examined and the associated assumptions need to be made explicit as part of what the stakeholder negotiation and learning process will focus on. This is especially the case in the current project funding environment, where vagueness of purpose might not get the support needed from stakeholders. This paper suggests how more forward-looking thinking with robust reflective analysis of actions already undertaken can be intertwined in a logic of analysis for developing ToCs of various CV&A interventions.

A recent Institute of Development Studies (IDS) review of a wide range of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs) shows that, at the moment, there are only very few situations where development practitioners have consciously and clearly outlined their ToCs in design documents. In these few cases, the documents reflect complicated ToCs involving a wide range of inputs and activities, various levels of objectives, some assumptions, several outputs and diverse intended outcomes (McGee and Gaventa, 2010). This makes it difficult to ascertain and assess evidence of the effectiveness and impact of TAIs. Acknowledging the complexity of TAIs, the recommendation for developing ToCs in this field is thus as follows:

> The kind of theory of change that is needed is not one developed in abstract that reflects a notion of change processes as linear, predictable and rigid – as log-frames sometimes do. The point is, rather, that it is necessary to surface and make explicit the pathways via which complex initiatives, destined to take effect in complex circumstances, are expected to have their effect, and to continuously revisit this throughout the initiative, in recognition that social contexts and processes are always in flux, with emergent issues, unforeseen risks and surprises arising throughout (McGee and Gaventa, 2010: 28).

1.3   Embracing complexity and surprises

This paper uses the experience so far of designing and implementing the Mwananchi Governance and Transparency Fund (GTF) programme to build on observations on TAIs to explore what might be useful in thinking about developing useful ToCs around CV&A interventions. CV&A interventions are about

change that involves complex[6] power-driven relationships between citizens and their governments at various levels of engagement. These relationships are rooted in ongoing actor contestation, negotiation and struggle over issues, resources, power and authority as well as cooperation around some common objectives. This means there is an ongoing complex process of bargaining and negotiation through the use of various forms of citizen identities and categorisations[7] at the interfaces among citizens and with state actors. These are what Long (2001) calls 'arenas',[8] which characterise the spatial and social interfaces of everyday life.

The kinds of bargains and negotiations that take place in these arenas of CV&A action cannot be represented clearly in ToCs within often linearly structured logical frameworks. When log-frames are used, they often lead to oversimplification as to how the change in relationships actually happens in a given context. Programme teams find safety in making simple assumptions that allow them to focus attention on 'the low-hanging fruit' and in working with high risk aversion, 'which are both likely to lead (in the long run) to irrelevant programming in the face of complexity' (Jones, 2011: 6).

Therefore, there is a need to develop CV&A ToCs that embrace the complexity and dynamism associated with citizen–state relations across diverse and dynamic arenas of engagement and politics. Engaging politically could, in fact, be the main mechanism for enrolling other actors in a project. In essence, any given ToC should be considered as a table on which the various stakeholders can put their initial understanding or reading of what they think is happening to the relationship between citizens and their governments. A learning process should be deliberately embedded in the programme so as to allow stakeholders to reflect on what they think is happening and to examine their assumptions. This process will also provide a mechanism for dialogue on various perspectives and meanings, which will change along the way, and hence a tool for knowledge generation on how CV&A interventions in a particular context should be approached.

There is thus a need for a framework to enable the systematic understanding of complex citizen–state interactions—to explain them while also engaging in a mapped out process of learning and unlearning among stakeholders. To this end, this paper intends to push for an incremental ToC development process, one which is progressive and cyclic, based on both forward-looking interventions and a robust retrospective learning analysis (always asking 'how did we get here?')

The first section of the paper presents the logic of CV&A ToCs, laying the groundwork for how evidence from the Mwananchi programme will be used to construct an argument for locating CV&A ToCs within specific contexts based on everyday governance realities. A number of case studies are presented and discussed before we move on to framing the logic for CV&A ToCs, drawing on relevant elements of OM and PEA. The paper ends with a reconfigured theory-based framework which can be used to inform the policy and practice of CV&A interventions around specific issues and contexts.

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[6] 'Complexity' is a situation whereby, among other things, relationships between dimensions are frequently non-linear: that is, when change happens, it is frequently disproportionate and unpredictable (Jones, 2011).

[7] Identities refer to how a social actor understands him or herself to be within a particular social setting; categorisations refer to how other people define the same actor. For example, other actors in a given social setting might define a person as a youth (as a way of categorising) and therefore without power to make decisions, whereas the person in question might identify themselves as a son of a chief, and therefore with authority, and hence might want to be making decisions.

[8] The concept of 'arenas' is preferred here to that of 'public sphere' in conceptualising CV&A projects as the latter implies the existence of some kind of spatial or social area where people can talk freely because they know the rules of engagement and have largely shared meanings on what the discussion is about. The reality is, in politicised citizen–state relationships, interactions are often based on images (including both suspicion and trust) of what the agenda for discussion is and where it will lead.

2. ToCs in practice

Figure 2 (see section 2.1), and the explanation of assumptions that follows, shows the resultant outcomes framework from the following recommendation:

> Every community needs a roadmap for change. Instead of bridges, avenues and freeways, this map would illustrate destinations for progress and the routes to travel on the way to achieving progress. The map would also provide commentary about assumptions, such as the final destination, the context for the map, the processes to engage in during the journey and the belief system that underlies the importance of travelling in a particular way. This type of map is called a 'theory of change' (ORS, 2004: 1).

As regards CV&A programmes and projects, the final destination (goal) is a local, sub-national or national situation whereby there is better government accountability and responsiveness.[9] There should be evidence that this change in accountability and responsiveness emanates from diverse and complex factors, one of which being an improvement in the way citizens express their views and hold government to account. However, as discussed in Section 1, the routes towards this destination cannot be fully predetermined, given the frequently complex nature of citizen–state relations in the various social, cultural, economic and political contexts. Most of the bridges will be discovered and constructed along the way by those walking the path of change, supported by the specific CV&A programme.[10]

In the case of the Mwananchi programme, the starting point (or otherwise the starting ToC) was a theory-based evaluation framework of voice and accountability (V&A) projects which the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) conducted across various country contexts, as shown in Figure 1.

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[9] According to DFID (2006) 'responsiveness' pertains to the effort a government is making to meet the expressed needs of citizens. 'Accountability', on the other hand, pertains to institutionalised (formal or informal) relationships between citizens and their government actors, some of which encourage better responsiveness (see Moore and Teskey, 2006).

[10] Reeler's (2007) three models of social change are helpful in trying to think about the nature of complexity that already exists in a context and how to approach it in developing ToCs. Reeler argues, for instance, that in situations of chaos, disrupted social identities, relationships, structures or leadership, the change should be thought of as largely **emergent** in nature. We think this could be true of contexts of prolonged conflict or post-conflict instabilities. On the other hand, in stable contexts facing sudden crisis (e.g. a sudden shock from lowering prices of crops on the market, change in government), **transformative** changes tend to take place, involving unlearning and learning to adjust to the shock or crisis. Lastly, in situations of stability, where everyone knows what they are doing and towards what end, conscious plans can be made with a greater degree of predictability of ends and steps towards them. This is **projectable** change. In contexts where CV&A projects are implemented, 'emergent and transformative changes are more likely than changes that can be projectised with high degrees of prediction.

Figure 1: Theory-based framework for V&A projects

Source: Foresti et al. (2007: 11).

The focus of attention is on enhancing the role of civil society, the media, elected representatives and traditional leaders, as the 'channels' or 'interlocutors'[11] for strengthening citizen demand for good governance. Six very differently governed African countries—Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia—were selected, and a number of local organisations were provided with small grants to achieve their desired CV&A results through an action research approach.[12] Given the divergence between the six very different countries and the complexities of the societies within them, the ToC was very 'broad':[13] the programme team did not understand all the six country contexts well, except through previous research. The section below discusses the evolution of the Mwananchi ToC and what has been learnt from it, with a view to locating how CV&A pathways of change work in practice, which is discussed in the sections that follow.

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[11] 'Interlocutors' in CV&A projects are organisations or individuals that are questioning or otherwise interrogating the *status quo* in the various arenas of citizen–state interactions so as to change the rules of the game in favour of marginalised citizens. It is this interlocution that could enhance citizens' ability to make the necessary demands and hold governments to account.

[12] These organisations are funded on one-year project cycles for three consecutive years, backed by capacity development support and an in-country governance expert, usually from a think-tank (often a relevant department of a university), who acts as an 'insider adviser' and also an 'outsider evaluator' on an ongoing basis throughout the project cycle. They document and write up case studies on what is being observed and interact with grantees and the lead organisation (the National Coordination Organisation) from time to time. **Action research** here refers to 'a participatory, democratic process concerned with developing practical knowing in the pursuit of worthwhile human purposes […]. It seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others, in search of practical solutions to issues of pressing concern to people' (Reason, 2005: p.6).

[13] Broad ToC refer to situations whereby the ToC provides the preconditions thought of as necessary for reaching the long-term goal in a broad sense, but the pathways of change are not provided and are left to interveners (often grantees) to define. There is a great deal of flexibility left as to how to get to the long-term goal and redefine preconditions (see Act Knowledge and Aspen Institute Roundtable on Comprehensive Community Initiatives, 2003).

2.1   The Mwananchi ToC: learning from design and implementation

The premise for the Mwananchi ToC is that, in neo-patrimonial[14] governance contexts, citizens' actions *per se* might not lead to significant changes to the prevailing rules of game to enable and sustain the desired V&A outcomes and impacts. Rather, emphasis should also be given to particular agents of change that work with or alongside ordinary citizens in engaging with state actors at various citizen–state interfaces. It is these interlocutors (individuals, organisations or groups of organisations) that provide the needed political leverage[15] for citizens to express their views effectively and to hold their governments to account. From this premise, the argument is that **supporting interlocutors (game changers) in leveraging citizen engagement in various arenas of citizen–state interactions will effectively strengthen citizen demand for good governance, including holding governments to account.**

In order to provide the necessary support to interlocutors, three theory-based outcomes were proposed, considered the necessary preconditions for getting interlocutors to work out transformative relations between citizens and their governments. These outcomes were: better-defined and enhanced institutional roles of interlocutors in relation to the roles of the state; synergy among interlocutors based on their comparative advantages; and better use of research-based evidence to influence policies[16] and engage citizens.

Figure 2: The outcomes framework of the Mwananchi ToC

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
[14] **Neo-patrimonialism** is a term used for patrons using state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is indicative of informal patron–client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in, say, small villages (Wikipedia, accessed on 12 September 2011).

[15] Political leverage refers to the advantage an actor has over others, which enables him/her to achieve his/her objectives, among other actors who are politically pursuing their objectives at the same interface (Tembo, 2003: 172).

[16] ODI conducted consultations with civil society organisations (CSOs) around the world in order to establish the extent of their use of research-based evidence and produced two good practice Working Papers (Court et al., 2006; Pollard and Court, 2005). The initiative—the Civil Society Partnership Programme—supported under a Department for International Development (DFID) Programme Partnership Agreement, resulted in the formulation of a community of practice network called the Evidence-based Policy in Development Network, which has drawn a wide range of members from across the world.

Implementing the programme over time, at the same time as re-examining assumptions, learning from the context and closely monitoring indicators of change, has led to a sharper understanding and hence fine-tuning of the original ToC. How change happens through the agency of interlocutors and how to think about context are the two most significant areas of refinement that have occurred at the broad ToC level. These two elements of the CVA ToC are discussed in the following sub-sections. There has also been a change in approach with regard to the three outcome areas indicated in Figure 2, mainly at the level of specific, issue-based ToCs[17]. These are discussed in later sections.

2.2   From interlocutor as an organisation to interlocution as a process

Three years of programme implementation have led the programme team to gradually shift emphasis from organisations to looking for possibilities of 'interlocution' as a functional element or organisational performance. Although this approach was considered conceptually in the first conceptual framework (see Tembo, 2010), its practical application was not clarified.

A focus on interlocution as a process at a much deeper level means that, depending on the contextual dynamics at work, an organisation might succeed or fail to be a game changer. It will be regarded as an interlocutor only when it is an active game changer in the given context rather than just because it is registered as working in a particular context. In other words, the initial Mwananchi emphasis, as we have seen, was on the media, civil society, elected representatives (mainly members of parliament (MPs) and local councillors) and traditional leaders, as interlocutors, in an organisational sense. However, after implementing and examining changes happening in various contexts and reflecting on how they are occurring, understandings of which actors are interlocutors now go beyond these nominal organisational categories to look at what exactly they are doing in each given context to make CV&A changes happen or not happen.

This means that, although the focus of attention is still on CSOs, the media, elected representatives and traditional leaders, these are understood and treated as working categories. The programme's real interest is in what they do in practice and across different contexts and governance issues. As a result of this, interlocutors are also identified from among state actors, either in the bureaucracy or in decentralised structures. Some come from the private sector or are individuals in the community who have, for instance, retired from civil service and hence know how the state operates.

In any case, what makes an interlocutor is their interest in the issue the community is concerned about and, for one reason or the other, their willingness to act on the community's behalf. It is also about having spaces and opportunities to act, or being able to create opportunities and spaces when these are not available. An example is of businesses mobilising local communities by providing them with critical information to hold the local council to account on the implementation of a road improvement policy. They are doing this because the road is also used for transporting goods to their business premises, which a top priority for them. For the poor farmers, the priority is to transport their crops to markets and inputs from markets to their farms.

In this case, the poor farmers might not succeed if they act alone because they do not have enough and accurate information about local government policy in the area and, despite sharing a general need, do not have an organised voice. On the other hand, businesses cannot act alone because they do not have politically legitimate voices in the council and might be regarded as having the money to improve the roads by themselves. It is this convergence of diverse yet shared outcome interests that enables successful change happen. The businesses have acted as interlocutors of change while meeting their

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[17] The Figure above only shows the framework outcomes, which are just part of the Mwananchi programme log-frame. The log-frame also has a list of outputs, activities, indicators and assumptions.

own interests. Interlocution of this nature works well when there are several other winners or perceived winners from the process, so multiple sources of pressure for change are created within a short time[18].

Some strategically placed actors around a governance issue that requires changing could be influenced deliberately so they become or act as interlocutors. This is a very common strategy among CSOs because many actors (individuals and organisations) are found to be occupying strategic spaces for change but not acting or behaving in ways that can contribute effectively to the desired change. In Malawi, for example, most *Liu Lathu* (Our Voice) projects included area development committees (ADCs) and village development committees (VDCs) as interlocutors around constituency development funds (CDFs) and local development funds (LDFs). This is because these committees are recognised in Malawi's Local Government Act and in the LDF design.

However, in trying to position themselves in readiness for party campaigns, ruling party government officials are said to have informally introduced other party-specific structures in the same communities (led by a party governor). This has made ADCs and VDCs passive in most communities. In terms of legitimacy of representation, however, ADCs and VDCs are recognised and represented at the local council (district council) and civil society has sought to enhance their roles in order to get citizens' voice heard at the council level and vice versa.

The challenge in taking this pathway of change (trying to encourage interlocution from existing structures and actors) is that the CSOs concerned have to keep an eye on the strategies party-led parallel structures are using in order to exert their influence. Although this is illegitimate in terms of the Local Government Act, MPs often assume the authority of councillors. This has happened because elected councillors have not been elected since 2000, leaving power and authority to MPs who are playing both councillor and legislature roles.[19]

The extent of this power and authority differs between ruling party MPs and those in opposition parties. Ruling party MPs have direct access to patronage resources from the central government (MPs say, 'if you accept government, you accept development', equating government to the ruling party). This was reinforced in 2010 when a bill was passed in parliament giving powers to a ruling party Minister of Local Government to appoint the chief executives of district councils. The chief executive chairs the district development committee (DDC), the decision-making body on development at district level.

The main arena of struggle for the V&A project in this context, therefore, is how ADCs and VDCs can make effective interlocutors in the context of the informal and yet powerful ruling party parallel structures. The context is even more complicated because, currently, village chiefs, who are meant to represent ordinary citizens in the ADCs and VDCs, are now appointed or otherwise endorsed and paid by central government. This has significantly changed the incentive structures within which the accountability of these chiefs can be understood more generally and with respect to public goods provision (Eggen, 2011). This means the process of interlocution on transformative citizen–state relations cannot be assumed to happen through simple organisational categories, even if they are recognised as such in country laws and constitutions. The rules in use can be very different from the rules written down.

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[18] A good example here is a Choice Ghana (a Mwananchi project in Ghana) success story in influencing a 'difficult and authoritarian' paramount chief in East Gonja district to agree to put some of his loyalties from sales of community natural resources into a community fund so the community at large can benefit. In this case, both district assembly officials and sub-chiefs failed to influence the paramount chief because of the long tradition of chiefs treating royalties as their benefit from the power and authority vested in them. Choice Ghana found a strategy to connect with the chief and the district assembly and sub-chiefs took advantage of the approach and provided information to the CSO which made them successful. In other words, there were several winners from the initiative: the district assembly, community members, youths and sub-chiefs. Although not all of them were at the forefront of influence, they provided the needed strength to the interlocution process.

[19] The country's constitution demands that local elections be held in the year following the national general election. Malawi has had general elections every five years since 1994, but local elections to be held in 1995, 2005 and 2010 never took place. They have since been postponed to a possible 2015.

2.3   Understanding context: what it means in practice

Understanding context is one of the core building blocks of CV&A projects, hence Figure 1 beginning with 'socioeconomic and political context' to lead to identification of opportunities, constraints and entry points for CV&A. This means any useful ToC needs to be informed by an understanding of how context shapes interactions between state and citizens. The focus of attention will then be on establishing what kinds of interlocution processes work in each context, by which organisations or individuals. However, the Mwananchi programme shows that understandings of context often fall short of the actual dynamics that emerge when projects are in operation.

The Mwananchi programme adopted the World Governance Assessment (WGA) methodology[20] as a tool for establishing a broad understanding of national rules of the game. This was selected because it helps to analyse the way rules or norms (in the case of CV&A thinking, between citizens and state actors) are handled in each arena of interaction (Hyden et al., 2008), so as to understand outcomes emerging from investments in enhancing citizen voice (in the form of state responsiveness and accountability in the provision of public goods). The other tool that helps to capture the rules of the game and 'the here and now' kinds of issues is the Strategic Governance and Anti-corruption Assessment (SGACA)[21] (Unsworth and CRU, 2007).

However, it was realised that, given the complexity, dynamic nature and specificity of arenas of citizen–state actions that CV&A interventions target, there was a need for access to specific negotiations in order to be able to examine the strategies and tactics used when interlocution processes are actually happening. Systematic exploration of these specific interactions, some of which may prove critical events[22] or tipping points for change, could then provide more robust evidence on how V&A occurs in different contexts than could be accessed through the widely conducted processes in WGA and SCAGA.

This would help in developing ToCs that are based on drilling down to the particular incentives and interests of the actors involved, and how they shape citizen–state negotiations and outcomes around a number of public goods being provided. Tools such as WGA and SCAGA help to show broad evidence of clientelism[23] and rent-seeking behaviour among state actors and citizens and how they affect the kinds of voice and accountabilities that might work or not work. However, to see how this actually happens in practice (including accessing a wide range of strategies and tactics being used by citizens and the state), practical projects with real narratives in play have to be observed and analysed.

In other words, there is a need to look at narratives that come into play regarding CV&A within the context of 'everyday governance',[24] or the rules in use as experienced by real people and a concrete state in a given context (Blundo and Le Meur, 2008), and then to draw out ToCs from these realities. The case study in Box 1 shows some of the early project narratives found in Mwananchi Leh Wi Tok project in Sierra Leone.

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[20] See Annex 1 on how WGA works in practice.

[21] In addition to establishing the formal and informal rules of the game, SCAGA analyses power and change around 'foundational factors' (how government controls territory and the roots of social and economic factors that shape the political system, of long-term origin and slow change), and the 'here and now' (key actor capacities and interests and the events and pressures to which they are responding) (Unsworth and CRU, 2007).

[22] 'Critical events' refer to unexpected but significant occurrences which cause serious dissatisfaction among citizens as to what the government is doing. They often reflect serious limitations in government capability to get things done, manifesting as a shortfall in basic public goods, for example, where there is no clear demonstration to get things to change in the near future (Long, 2001). These situations, if well analysed, could be important opportunities for CV&A change. Some of these small but deep changes could also result in change in some of the foundational governance factors that SCAGA highlights.

[23] 'Clientelism' refers to a complex chain of personal bonds between political patrons or bosses and their individual clients or followers. These bonds are founded on mutual material advantage: the patron furnishes excludable resources (money, jobs) to dependants and accomplices in return for their support and cooperation (votes, attendance at rallies). Patrons have disproportionate power and thus enjoy wide latitude with regard to how to distribute the assets under their control.

[24] The idea of going beyond the prevailing literature-driven notions of governance and neo-patrimonialism, citizen empowerment and participation, to empirically based everyday practices and meanings. In this process, the normative elements of what things are and might be are laid bare, giving lived reality a chance to throw up evidence that might be different from what is uncritically taken for granted as practice.

Box 1: Parliament and the People in Sierra Leone

Democracy Sierra Leone, under the Mwananchi Sierra Leone programme, implemented Leh Wi Tok (Let the Voices of Ordinary People Be Heard Dialogue in Kono district. As part of this, meetings between citizens, local chiefs and elected representatives (councillors and MPs) were organised in Sandor and Kamara chiefdoms. In Kamara, the forum was organised in a town called Tombodu, where the world's third-largest diamond was found in 1972. One would expect many development initiatives to be taking place in the area, using diamonds as a resource. However, infrastructural development has been very weak, even before the rebel war: no good roads, no pipe-borne water and no tertiary education institution. In this context, Leh Wi Tok is aimed at enabling citizens to learn how to take hold of their destiny and to engage their government to improve their livelihoods.

During the meeting in Tombodu, 16-year-old Hafsatu Sherriff stood up and said she felt lucky to have had the opportunity to see and talk to her MP and councillor for the first time in her life. She reminded the councillor of the promise he made about constructing a well and toilet in her school campus. *'My question here this morning is to the councillor,'* the girl said. *'When you were campaigning, you told our people to vote for you, promising to construct a toilet and a well in our school but we are yet to see those things.'*

16-year-old Hafsatu Sherriff talking to her leaders

The forum made it possible for a young school-going girl to be able to speak to her elected representative without being seen as disrespectful. Even this is a change in her life, given that in Kono district, women are not allowed to lead, let alone sit with elected representative and traditional authorities to discuss development. The councillor promised again to build the items before he left office. The councillor also happens to be the deputy-chairman of Kono district council.

Councillor Tamba E. James   Honourable Emmanuel Babonjo

The MP placed his hand on his chest and congratulated the people for their constructive debate at the forum. *'I respect you all and feel proud that Democracy Sierra Leone will take your good behaviour to the funding agency of this project,'* he said (perhaps trying to deflect responsibility for funding community projects to the agency rather than government).

Another success story arising from the forum in this chiefdom related to the issue of mining companies operating in the area. Youths were very angry that these companies were bringing people from outside to work instead of employing those from the community. At the forum, they had the opportunity to inform their representatives about this development. They reached a decision to meet the companies and raise the issue with them. The MP, in his response to this issue, stated that there was a need for policy change, and that he was going to follow up to ensure it happened. *'They have the responsibility to train you and give you employment,'* he stressed. *'The Mines and Minerals Act of 2009 encourages them to do it.'*

Stories captured by Lebbie Nicol, Programme Officer, Leh Wi Tok.

The two stories in Box 1 describe a mechanism to bring citizens and public office holders together to promote linkages between state and society based on dialogue, a strategy common in CV&A projects. These fora fill the gap that exists between a completed election and the next campaign, during which elected representatives are rarely accountable to the people through open dialogue platforms. Having made a great many unrealistic promises that it may not be possible to meet, elected politicians seldom face the people in their constituency after being voted in. CSOs such as Democracy Sierra Leone act as brokers of relations, in a type of interlocution. They aim to create a platform where the MP is in a dialogical relationship with the people, which is a platform which MPs do not usually form except around elections.

In terms of developing the ToC, the real test lies in whether or not CV&A change outcomes are emerging as a result of this type of engagement. Leh Wi Tok undertakes to follow up on engagements such as the above, from the outset (when interactions are evident but change has not yet happened) and then throughout the implementation phase (when outcomes, both negative and positive, are observed and discussed among multiple stakeholders in terms of what they mean for CV&A). The 'unexpected' behaviour of actors such as the MP in the case above is not interpreted quickly and labelled a 'lack of willingness', or given any other rapid and easy label. It is instead given space for observation. In some cases, this observation process results in a shift in attention to citizens' behaviour as requiring change rather than to that of the public office holder.

The foregoing discussion shows the nature of contextual dynamics encountered in CVA interventions, which are often not accounted for and yet they significantly influence how change happens in various contexts. We next look at how CV&A changes themselves happen in the various contexts.

3.   How CV&A happens

This section explores how CV&A arises given the understanding of interlocution processes as going beyond simple organisational categories to real facilitation of transformative relationships. It also looks at how V&A emerges when the understanding of context goes beyond wider frameworks to factor in everyday governance situations that people face.

3.1   How citizens' voice emerges

Citizen voice is rooted in social norms such as 'respect for elders', which is enacted through symbols (such as kneeling while talking, etc.) as well as words that are well recognised in society. This means there is a particular way for words and their associated symbols to be enacted in order for the intended communication between youths and elders or between women and men to happen. It is this particular form of engagement that gains access to public office holders which hence can be regarded as one of the citizen voices that work.

For example, Choice Ghana (a Mwananchi-supported organisation in Ghana) enabled youths in East Gonja district to hold their traditional authority accountable on the use of community land and forest. It did this in the midst of a strong chieftaincy culture through creation of a dialogue platform whereby youths used their identity as youths of the community and fulfilled all traditional protocols, including kneeling down when speaking to the chief, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Example of social norms, citizenship and voice in Ghana

Photo by Participatory Development Associates (PDA).

In the case of Choice Ghana, recognition of the authority of the chief created a dialogue platform that resulted in the chief agreeing to open a community bank account to deposit royalties from sales of the society's natural resources (forestry products harvested by companies) to be used for community development. In the context of a strong chieftainship, not even the district assembly had been able to convince chiefs in the area to become transparent in their dealings with royalties and to contribute to community development. In this case, the youths managed to get what they wanted as a first step towards getting the chief to be more transparent in the management of resources which they know are of significant value and could benefit the whole community.

Public office holders also have a responsibility to respond in a particular way, which might involve the use of symbols and positions, so as to demonstrate what is locally understood as accountability and

responsiveness. The Sierra Leonean MP's act of placing his hand on his chest while speaking to the people (in Box 1) is a powerful symbol of deep listening and respect for the people. Similarly, in the case of Choice Ghana, once the youths demonstrated respect in accordance with local norms and culture, they were treated with respect by the chief and the elders. In essence, citizens undertake their responsibilities before claiming their rights.

Therefore, voice as expressed and heard within the socio-cultural rubric shapes a person's sense of who they are (with respect to age, gender, authority, etc.) and where they belong (implying a sense of association and obligations) (Chabal, 2009). These socio-cultural characteristics of voice are not locked away when people are acting in the capacity of public office. They are very much alive somewhere, despite increasing levels of education (see Mattes and Mughogho, 2009), which blurs the distinctions between personal/private/public expression of, and 'listening to', people's voices. This forms a significant part of what success or failure might mean in an interlocution process.

The key question to explore is, to what extent and under what circumstances does fulfilment of social practices associated with citizenship and public office deliver the results citizens expect?[25] The pathways of change in this case are about expanding spaces and opportunities for citizen voices to deliver further and clearer expression of citizens' views (including those of the marginalised). It is also about opportunities for citizens to sanction public office holders who fail to perform in ways that are suitable to the context in question.

It is important also to note that projects such as the Parliament and the People project in Box 1 suggest shifts in symbols and words that constitute voice. For example, a girl talks while standing up and speaking directly to elders, even though it is usual for girls of her age to speak through parents if they want to get their concerns heard in public meetings. This means that, when it comes to community projects, different groups of people are finding or even creating new opportunities for voice all the time. This happens in ways and using dynamics that cannot be forced by the CV&A project (if they are to work well). These transformations often do not come under the labels of 'marginalisation' or 'vulnerability' given to particular categories of people (e.g. youths or women) in the literature. These categorisations often result into generalisations of behaviour across different spatial and social contexts using representations that are markedly different from how those who actually live in the situation think about their environment. The categorisations also overlook the context-specific dynamics that reinforce marginality over time.[26]

The emergence of these spaces and actors in a CV&A project in ways that are integrated with the changing culture and power relations between citizens and their immediate institutions, and then state actors at various levels, is important for articulating and supporting citizens' voices. It is in these arenas of power and livelihoods that citizens find room for manoeuvre, through small or large nudges or tensions in their own culture and traditions. In the process, ordinary citizens also find the required political leverage to articulate and push for change when engaging with state actors. This constitutes the pathway of change for CV&A projects.

Citizens often strategically navigate their pathways towards sustaining or improving their livelihoods by building alliances with the like-minded or those from the same age group or sex. This is also a way of sharing the risks of engagement involved in speaking up to those in power. Citizens are at the same time strategically or tactically engaging with various external actors, who may come to them in the name of supporting the poor. This, too, is an important negotiation and bargaining process, often

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[25] It is important to explore these questions analytically in a CV&A project because public office holders and citizens can manipulate citizenship and social norms to their own ends (e.g. promote rent-seeking behaviour and patronage) that have nothing to do with development, especially inclusive development.

[26] Marginality can be seen as the other side of the coin to citizenship (where citizenship is discussed as a sociological term rather than as a nationality with a passport). In this case, some individuals could be experiencing (and feeling) marginality because of a situation such as their MP having lost an election. In most African multiparty democracies, with 'a winner takes all and loser loses all mentality', this means having no reliable representative to represent needs in parliament and losing out to most or all government programmes. However, when these marginalised people's candidate wins another election, or they find other routes to public resources, they can become the citizens they would like to be again and exercise their voices.

embedded in externally designed processes of participation or empowerment, which citizens often endure because they have access to resources in mind to meet their other needs—rather than the needs of the foreign project (Tembo, 2003). These realities are important for the interlocution process to take into account.

Two main conclusions on developing ToCs for CV&A can be drawn from Mwananchi experiences so far as to how voice emerges in these contexts. The first is that, given that voice is situated in ongoing informal relations, observation of the behaviour of the citizens in action is required. As described above, this might include listening to actual forms of words and how they are amplified through the use of physical symbols and postures informed by culture. It is important to note, however, that culture is not static but subject to continuous and multiple tensions created from within (and without) by interest groups—including the marginalised, as they seek to find more room to be listened to by those in social, economic and political power within society. Mechanisms of voice that interlocutors provide in their interlocution process must provide for these realities rather than just focusing on verbal interactions between citizens and state actors.

The second point is that interlocutors create various incentives for citizens to express their views in ways that are effective in getting state actors to respond. The same interlocution process provides incentives for state actors to respond in a way that delivers results, including what could be called, accountability and responsiveness. The case studies show it is both particular types of mechanisms and incentives (as forms of interlocution) for citizen voices that make a difference between a game-changing intervention and a *status quo* intervention.

The next subsections use further examples from Mwananchi to establish this reality as a critical component of CV&A ToCs. The objective is to show the many unanswered questions that projects often gloss over but that need to be explored in a ToC to find out 'why' and 'how', as discussed in Section 1. The Mwananchi programme is still exploring some of these questions as part of the learning process towards a deeper understanding of what works under what circumstances.

3.1.1 Mobilising and aggregating citizens' voices and engaging state actors

Given the diversity in citizen identities, categorisations and representations, mechanisms that work in terms of mobilising and aggregating citizens' voices differ from one situation to another. For example, in the Sierra Leone case cited in Box 1, the governance issues in question were about the provision of general public services in a community. Organising interface meetings between communities and service providers or communities and elected representatives might have been appropriate mechanism. The community–service provider approach has worked well in most social accountability approaches, such as when using the community-based performance monitoring (CBPM) tool.[27] However, where the issue in question is specific to a particular citizen group which might also be a marginalised group, different mechanisms have to be used in order to get citizens and the service providers to interface. For example, Masindi District Education Network (MADEN) in Uganda uses suggestion boxes, as shown in Box 2, to mobilise children's voices and aggregate these for interface discussions and lobbying with local education institutions and the ministry, as appropriate.

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[27] CBPM is a form of the community score card (CSC) approach. It was developed in The Gambia with support from the World Bank by blending into the CSC methodology a number of features of the strategic planning and action process developed in Sierra Leone. These new features include more elaborate focus group scoring methodologies to minimise opportunities for lateral influence on voting results, and the routine use of standard indicators (in addition to group-generated indicators) to facilitate the later use of score card data from multiple community events at the same facility, or at different facilities in the same sector. Such aggregated data can then be used for programme monitoring and/or advocacy purposes

Box 2: Bridging the gap through a suggestion box—change that pupils of Masindi want

To what extent does the involvement of education stakeholders in school management have an impact on the quality of services delivered? MADEN has attempted to answer this question in six primary schools in two sub-counties of Kimengo and Miirya. Before Mwananchi, there were cases of neglect of duty by teachers, parent–teacher associations (PTA), local leaders and parents, who reluctantly provided support to children to attend school. *'Issues of school governance were a responsibility of only the SMCs [school management committees] and PTA chairpersons who sometimes had limited time to attend to school matters,'* lamented one parent. Learners were not at all involved in the school governance process. Cases of child dropout were very high owing to lack of adequate facilities in schools. School-based child violence, particularly child labour, corporal punishment and sexual abuse, was rife. There were also concerns over insufficient school facilities such as sanitary facilities for girls. According to one MADEN staff member, *'No one was in position to mention these concerns and even then no one was listening.'*

The Mwananchi programme enabled MADEN to start an advocacy child club, each with 18 democratically elected members (9 girls and 9 boys) in the 6 primary schools to promote child participation in school governance. Each club has a club patron (teacher) selected by the club members, who provides advice. Because some learners cannot speak out assertively even within the clubs, a suggestion box has been established, with privacy ensured. The box has acted as a medium for communication between pupils and other stakeholders. Every second Friday, the box is officially opened and messages are read out in the presence of the club patron, some members of the SMC and advocacy club members. Pupils then prioritise the issues raised and the critical ones are discussed with the school administration and SMCs.

Critical issues emerging in the past six months
- Late release of pupils from school who have to clean the school compound
- Corporal punishment at school
- Lack of a first aid kit and irregular attendance by some teachers

Teachers at first resisted these dialogues, but they are gradually beginning to appreciate the process and are responding positively. Children are beginning to speak out. *'Today, as observed in one meeting held in Bigando Primary School, SMC debates are informed by what children are saying,'* revealed one MADEN staff member.

In Malawi, radio listening clubs (RLCs) are providing a community–service provider interface mechanism around the provision of a generic range of public services (e.g. schools, health clinics and water). However, in this case, the community is seen as being made up of citizens who have different capabilities to speak with service providers targeted for change to happen. For example, most women are seen as not able to speak effectively with the district health officer (DHO), even if they are the ones who know best the effects of poor water sources and lack of a health centre on children in their community. The CSO in this case mobilises people's voices (including women) through tape recordings, which are then sent to the appropriate service providers (referred to as duty bearers). For

example, an RLC engaged local communities in Zomba with the DHO, who then immediately opened a village clinic in the area. According to the DHO, the government was not aware that communities were facing difficulties in accessing health services. How much difference information makes between weak and strong service provision requires further exploration in terms of the behaviour of public office holders (such as the DHO) and the institutions in which they make decisions over time.

In other cases, service providers arrange meetings in the communities where the recordings were made in order to explain the government position. In this case, they will have already listened to the various voices from the community, even if some groups fail to speak during the face-to-face meeting. In Zambia, this interface happens through 'call-in' radio programmes, whereby media organisations such as Yatsani Radio help communities and service providers to interrogate issues without them having to meet face-to-face. This mechanism enhances citizens' voices by providing a platform that avoids cultural and other power impediments to some citizens' voices. Many organisations are now trying to explore social media mechanisms to achieve the same ends.

However, there are difficulties associated with civil society brokering of citizen–state interfaces through remote interface mechanisms, such as the often unanswered questions around their sustainability, given their reliance on project funding. Projects such as the RLCs in Malawi are trying to address this by exploring and dealing with the structural impediments that exist between service providers (such as the DHO) and citizens in communities where public service provision issues are raised.

It is recognised, for instance, that the main decision-makers on service provision to communities are members of sub-national committees of the decentralised government structure in Malawi: the DDCs and the lower governance structures (ADCs and VDCs). These are the structures through which information on clinics is expected to flow, to then be discussed by the DDC. The project team also works with communities to explore actual entitlements on which the DHO is now able to draw and positively respond to community requests. These are regarded as important elements of the CV&A implementation process, rather than the focus being on just the outputs, such as the number of new clinics and schools constructed through the work of specific public office holders. In terms of how voice emerges, therefore, links with decentralised governance structures are a critical pathway of change.

3.1.2 Incentives for mobilising and aggregating citizens' voices and engaging state actors

Mobilising and aggregating citizens' voice is part of the strategy for action that also involves working around incentives and interests that exist in local communities. In other words, citizens are not just waiting to be organised to engage in governance issues, even if they face them in their daily lives. There are many incentivising activities undertaken by CSOs to mobilise citizens, and these incentives become even more complicated if diverse groups of people are to be organised. In Uganda, for example, a music band is being used to alert people of meetings, and then a puppet show (as shown in Figure 4) is staged to communicate key messages. This is then worked into a formal meeting which local government officials attend to discuss citizen issues.

Figure 4: Puppet show used in Uganda to mobilise citizens

Photo by Sarah Hunt, ODI.

The nature of incentives for mobilising citizens varies from one context to another, from promising food, to dancing, to linking to something most citizens want to listen to. In other cases, people are not necessarily expected to come together but are presented with a virtual space, for example a radio programme they can call into. This indicates that CSOs put a great deal of work into understanding the interests and dynamics of these citizen interests that is not normally included in project reports. However, some CSOs feel politics have created citizen apathy among communities. As the executive director for Community Development and Child Welfare Initiatives (CODI) put it, rather crudely,

> The biggest challenge to democratic governance in the area and in the country at large thus is not the crude, corrupt and undemocratic leadership or weak institutions of state but rather the largely politically docile, powerless, indifferent and apathetic population that is unable to exercise its constitutional duties or even protect their rights (Presentation at Mwananchi Reflection Meeting, Munyonyo, 10 June 2011).

Although this interpretation cannot be generalised to all governance contexts, it suggests there have been historical moments in these countries that have discouraged citizens from seeking and sustaining positive engagement with their government. Any effective ToC would have to delve into what people's perspectives of benefits and risks of engagement are and how these have been moulded over time. It also reflects that the interlocution process is heavily reliant on the kinds of interpretations the interlocutors have of the prevailing situation that needs changing.

The emergent nature of our understanding of voice also implies the need for access to a complex web of relational issues, such as the cultural symbols and the roles of interlocutors themselves in developing mechanisms of voice and mobilising citizens around these. This latter dimension involves understanding the prevailing incentives and interests in the community as well as of governments.

As regards incentives for the government to listen to citizens' voices, there are several. For instance, engagement is seen to be enhanced when there is compelling evidence involving citizens in the situation. What makes 'compelling evidence' differs from one context to another and from one issue to another. There are also supply-side factors that influence how state actors respond to evidence. For example, what worked in the case of Basic Needs Ghana, a local organisation that works with people with mental health issues, was production and presentation of a photo book and then a number of associated incentives. These included the setting up of dialogue platforms where key actors in mental health policy-making were exposed to the documentary. These included the minister of health, senior officials of the Ministry of Local Government, district chief executives, a cross section of the media,

people with mental illness, etc. Extensive collaboration with the media increased public awareness on issues of mental health. Eight newspaper publications, three television broadcasts and numerous radio programmes and discussions on mental health issues were carried out by the media the week after the launch and exhibition.

These engagement actions have produced the following results so far:

- Increased awareness and knowledge of mental health issues among the general public;
- Increased interest, awareness and knowledge of mental health challenges among policy-makers and elected representatives;
- Progress in parliament on the Mental Health Bill. A reading was carried out before the full house a few weeks after the launch of the photo book;
- The Ministry of Health working towards improving mental health services in the northern sector of the country, for example providing district mental health nurses in two districts of the Northern region that did not have mental health nurses.

Other clearer supply side-factors have helped to complement the aims of Basic Needs, for example the request by key mental health officials, such as the chief psychiatrist, that parliament pass the Mental Health Bill to help address some of the gaps in the system. The chief psychiatrist publicly argued that the bill, if passed into law, would provide stronger protection of the rights of the mentally ill, facilitate the integration of mental health services into the mainstream health care delivery system, and ensure better access, convenience and reduced costs for mental health patients.

Furthermore, the government's own interest in improving mental health care after the embarrassing media exposure played in the favour of Basic Needs, because there was more willingness on the part of public and elected officials to engage on the issue. An additional and equally important contributory factor in creating a conducive environment for the grantee's work is the fact that the president in April 2010 paid a surprise visit to Accra Psychiatric Hospital and promised government support to improve the situation.

The following section delves into how citizens' voices influence accountability, drawing on practical experiences.

3.2   How accountability happens

3.2.1   Conceptualising accountability and examining practice in CV&A terms

The concept of accountability carries many definitions in the literature. A common definition, informed from work on social accountability, is of 'a pro-active process by which public officials inform about and justify their plans of action, their behaviour and results and are sanctioned accordingly' (Ackerman, 2005). In terms of how accountability happens in practice, Box 1 shows one among many ways that demand for accountability happens in Africa. As indicated on voice above, the girl demands answerability from the elected representatives, using the comfort of the community to break through the culture of silence and 'respect', coupled with her own struggle to be directly heard.

In terms of her specific demand, she links it to the promises made during the campaign period. This could have been part of the social compact between citizens and their elected officials in that context. In other words, elected representatives articulate their obligations through a set of promises made during elections, even if they are communicated informally. The real test of accountability is in delivery and in the nature of sanctions that follow, especially if performance does not match expectations.

The case of a youth organisation, 2410, in Zambia sheds further insights into what happens in the arena of promises and how they are negotiated. In this case, youths went beyond the social compact derived from informal relations with local councillors to design a formal contract or social contract, as shown Figure 5, to demand accountability from their elected councillors.

Figure 5: Social contract prepared by 2410 in Zambia

2 1 0
My Country, My Future
Permanent House, Cairo Road, 2nd Floor, Room S239
P.O. Box 36524, Lusaka; Tel phone: 0211-227513; Email: admn2410@gmail.com

AGREEMENT OF SERVICE DELIVERY BETWEEN ELECTED LEADERS AND THE COMMUNITY

This service delivery agreement is made this...30TH.....day of...AUGUST......2011, by and between **ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES**, Hereinafter called, Aspiring Councilor(First party) and **THE ELECTORATES**, Hereinafter called, the **Community**(Second party).

WITNESSETH: That in consideration of the **RESOLUTIONS** and **AGREEMENTS** passed this...30TH.....day of...AUGUST.....2011, in Lusaka Province at...KAMANGA COMMUNITY HALL.....In CHAKUNKULA WARD......at a meeting called "**Meet your Aspiring Councilor**" 'agree to perform my responsibilities respectively when elected as a **COUCILOR** as herein stated:

1. WATER PROBLEM WITHIN THE CHIKUNKULA WARD TO BE SORTED OUT WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER ELECTED AS A COUNCILOR.

2. ALL GARBAGE TO BE COLLECTED WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER ELECTED AS A COUNCILOR.

3. UP-GRADING OF KAMANGA ROADS AND HOUSING. ADVOCATE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH INSTITUTION (CENTRE) IN KAMANGA COMPOUND.

4. YOUTHS TO BE INVOLVED IN DECISION MAKING AND USE OF WARD DEVELOPMENT FUND THROUGH A MID AND END OF YEAR INDABA CALLED BY THE COUNCILOR.

5. REHABILITATION OF RECREATION FACILITIES, E.G FOOTBALL GROUNDS.

The difference between the Sierra Leone and the Zambia types of accountability is that in the Zambia case a contract is to be signed. However, these cases do not necessarily tell us which form of exacting accountability is more effective than the other. It could be the case that in Sierra Leone the pressure of questioning during open community meetings exacts accountability effectively, whereas in Zambia people need something more than words to define the domain around which the representative will be held accountable. These aspects might be traceable back to the 'rules in use' knowledge from WGA or SCAGA analyses, but their exact nature requires close analysis of the actions of the actors involved. In other words, exactly how the negotiations around accountability domains are constructed between citizens and their elected representatives requires a deeper exploration of the dynamics in question.

For instance, in terms of the elected representatives who are making the promises, it is possible that these promises come from the interests and incentive structures that candidate MPs have formed over the years of multiparty democracy when faced with a competitive election process. The local councillor in Zambia referred to the campaign time as 'the heat of the moment', when anything can be said in order to win, and as the main reason for empty promises. In this case, he meant that the focus was on winning and then later on finding your own way to meet some of the promises or to negotiate raised expectations. The promises made, and hence domains of accountability, are usually not drawn from codified institutional responsibilities as defined in parliamentary charters or procedures. Mwananchi narratives also show that there tend to be significant differences in fulfilling obligations between elected representatives whose political parties have won the election and those whose parties have lost. This happens because the 'winner takes all' practice in most countries reinforces patronage relationships with constituencies.

In terms of sanctions from citizens on state actors, their effectiveness depends on the context and the state actor in question, and the incentive structures in which they are operating. In the Sierra Leone case, for instance, we do not know how the girl and her school or community will sanction the elected representative if he does not deliver if the conversation cited above ends up with the MP making another promise and not delivering. The conversation also does not tell us if the girl and her community can sanction the MP on his new promise. It is possible that MPs can go on making promise after promise, with promises becoming ways of accounting and no mechanisms to break the trend. In this regard, Leh Wi Tok has to explore the process after the observed engagement. However, as also pointed about above, it could be that the MP is seeing more than a girl standing up and asking the

question, and rather the relations she has and the powers and authority beyond her; that imagined or real 'beyond the girl' power might be effective in sanctioning performance.

Similarly, in the case of social contract signing, as in the Zambia case, it is important to follow through on how local councillors interpret the social contract and actually abide by it. Contracts will likely send a stronger signal of the need for accountability but, depending on the way the rules of the game are handled (see WGA or SCAGA analysis), might not guarantee accountability. The project could also explore how to make these social contracts legally binding, which might make them stronger than they are at the moment because they would then enable legal accountability.[28] However, the actual effectiveness of social contracts of this nature in delivering accountability is dependent on how the judiciary works and the ability of ordinary citizens to access justice as well as to be credible in the face of a justice system that might itself be vulnerable to elite control. In some contexts, the nature of clientelistic relations suggests that it is informal social pressure, rather than access to formal justice mechanisms, that is effective in exacting accountability.

The nature and effectiveness of sanctions also comes through in the youths and mining case, also in Box 1. In this case, the youths were said to be very angry that mining companies were bringing people from outside to work. The MP's response to these demands could be regarded as better than that in the case of the girl above because, in this case, he makes reference to policy and commits to having it changed. Reference to laws and policy is often regarded as a better basis for engagement because it sets the standards based on the established rules of the game. As discussed above, promises linked to legal frameworks might be stronger than those that are just personal gestures of the public office holder. The MP's actions could also be said to be representing a capacity to play the role of a legislature and oversight on laws. However, we cannot really draw firm conclusions on any of these issues unless we delve into the incentives and interests of the actors involved in the action.

Similarly, on the side of citizens, we do not know exactly how the anger of the youths in the cited case study was expressed, and which youths were involved. These questions are important to explore because, within an entrenched economic activity such as mining, there are likely to be some youths who have been benefiting from some forms of relationship with both mining brokers and government actors. These incentives and practices might undermine what emerges as 'youth voice', and how it is sustained beyond this meeting in order for change to happen. In terms of the MP's response, we need also to ask whether it was the youths' anger that triggered the response given or whether there were other incentives. The MP may have said what he said because it sounded good, but in real sense his interests may be more aligned with those of the mining industry than with those of the youths. The CV&A programme therefore puts a strong emphasis on understanding incentives and mapping interests as follow-up actions on the various forms of citizen–state actor engagement.

Therefore, in order to establish the pathway of change, it is also important to focus on the mechanisms and spaces CSOs are helping to create in order to enable citizens to exact accountability from state actors, as observed in Section 3.1. The analysis can then focus on the interests and incentives that seem to be in play in these engagement mechanisms or spaces.

3.2.2 Working with mechanisms and incentives for accountability to happen

What seems to emerging from our analysis of mechanisms and incentives is that, in situations where an issue is either contested or not well agreed among various stakeholders, CSOs use mechanisms whereby citizens are organised away from state actors or system and then gradually draw in the state actors concerned. The hope is that the results from organising outside the official process will become undeniable evidence of what the community needs, and hence incentivise positive government responses. There are many situations where Mwananchi grantees are using this mechanism to facilitate citizen demand for government accountability and responsiveness. What matters in this case is the provision of practical evidence (ordinary people's lived experiences) to demonstrate results in the

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[28] Legal accountability refers to mechanisms 'aimed at ensuring that the actions of public officials are legally and constitutionally framed' (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006: 5-6).

direction of what is possible if government act differently, for example in the World Voices Uganda project on Bataka courts, as shown in Box 3.

Box 3: Bataka courts offer space to the Mwananchi of Kibaale district in Uganda

Ordinary citizens face a number of challenges to accessing justice services in Uganda. Formal justice systems often do not listen to the poor and the procedures often intimidate them. The language used, the bureaucracy and the high costs make access to justice unlikely. Formal systems emphasise judgement and penalty as opposed to reconciliation, resulting in escalating conflicts among community members.

Bataka courts (literally meaning 'ordinary citizens' courts') (managed by seven trusted elder members nominated by the community) are community-based informal justice institutions. This is an innovative way to promote access to justice service for the poor. The courts also act as justice inception centres that refer cases to the formal sector, specifically the Local Council 1 (LC1).

Jahali (female) is the chairperson of Kentomi Bataka court:

'I was reluctant to join these courts as I doubted its mandate, capacity and level of acceptance from government. However, this changed after the three-day training from World Voices Uganda on how to dispense justice. I began to appreciate this structure. We have become saviours for scores of vulnerable people who have been victims of injustice. We have so far handled 44 cases and referred 6 to the LC1 court, police and World Voices Uganda legal officer.'

Jahali reported the experience of Kesande, a woman saved from death threats by her husband.

'My husband threatened to kill me several times. He usually chased me with a machete. I had to run away and sleep at friends' homes or in the bush. I tried to report to the police and LC1 but they were not listening because I could not pay for opening up a file that would kick-start the hearing of a case. One day a community member told me of Kentumi Bataka Court, where I reluctantly went because I was not sure whether they would help. The court intervened without asking me to pay any money.

They talked to my husband and informed him of the legal implications of his actions and now he treats me with respect. We are now living together in harmony.'

Jahali receives a file of tools from the assistance chief administrative officer at the inauguration of the Bataka court.

However, in situations where the issue is well known and there is general agreement shared among both citizens and state actors, CSOs are able to organise coalitions that include state actors right from the start. In such situations, state actors can provide advice on how to approach issues within the rest of the bureaucracy. For example, in Mchinji district in Malawi, the Women's Hope for Change organised a governance coalition aimed at changing formal and informal institutions that reinforced domestic violence and those that could reduce domestic violence. After mapping the actors involved in the issue of justice around domestic violence, they included the police, magistrates and the district assembly in the coalition. They created a dialogue forum for these actors to discuss domestic violence issues together with the community, the media and non-governmental organisation (NGO) members of the coalition.

As a result of this arrangement, magistrates were able to provide information on what the law says about domestic violence and the loopholes that still exist because the law has not been revisited since colonial times. Civil society leaders in the coalition have now been able to take these issues to appropriate government offices and also to engage other CSOs for a greater voice around laws that they

understand well. They have also sought to influence the MPs in the area, as well as the committee responsible for looking at law revisions, so they can develop a parliamentary bill to go towards legislation to address the weaknesses in the law. This would in turn form the basis for magistrates to deliver justice. These later actions are yet to produce results.

In order to successfully facilitate citizens' to hold government to account, CSOs can also provide linkages among local, sub-national and national networks of organisations. A good example is the case of education for the deaf in Zambia, as described in Box 4.

Box 4: Towards an inclusive special education system for the deaf in Zambia

The 1995 Education Policy in Zambia indicates that, by 1995, there were only 31 special education institutions—28 at primary, 1 at secondary and 2 at tertiary levels, a situation that has hardly changed since. A needs assessment study conducted in 2010 by Christian Information Network (CIN) looking at special education gaps for the deaf in Kabwe and Lusaka revealed that teaching and learning resources such as schools, books, teachers, sign language and visual materials were either not adequate or lacking in most schools. In view of this, CIN has adopted e-learning as an alternative method.

CIN, in partnership with Zambia Deaf Vision, deaf children and other coalition members, has been championing the education needs of the deaf in order to stimulate action and influence policy towards ensuring that the deaf access special education equitably, particularly an e-learning platform in the target sites. Two media forums with key media houses and coalition partners have been held to agree on a strategy for publicity and advocacy campaigns. So far, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that these efforts have created awareness among both government and members of the public on the present standard of education for the deaf.

Following consultations and interactions with coalition partners, deaf children, Panos and some parliamentarians, CIN were asked to make a written submission to the clerk of the National Assembly of Zambia. Submissions were made in 2010 to the Parliamentary Committees on Education, Science and Technology and Health, Community Development and Social Welfare. Based on this, a select committee was constituted to verify and consider the issues raised in the submission, which focused on the special education gaps in the 2010 Education Bill, ranging from inadequate teaching and infrastructural facilities and harmonisation of sign language to the absence of a provision for e-learning. The 2010 bill was withdrawn to take care of the concerns raised.

Furthermore, media networking efforts and engagement with policy-makers including parliament opened up spaces for dialogue for CIN, which was invited to make presentations on e-learning and education challenges for the deaf on the commemoration of Human Rights Day under the theme 'Speak Up Stop Discrimination' and at the National 2010 National Youth Indaba, where it was accompanied by 24 deaf youths.

Grassroots to sub-national thinking about alternative structures that deliver accountability has emerged strongly in Mwananchi projects, showing that the actual links to decentralisation processes and accountability structures take different characteristics in different contexts. In some cases, citizens and CSOs do not trust the effectiveness of decentralised governance structures set up by government and prefer to work directly with line ministries and concerned politicians. The agenda in this case is to tease out the engagement practices and behaviours that produce this mistrust and have the actors discuss alternative structures at various levels. It is important to bear in mind the lesson learnt from World Bank Social Funds, whereby the ToC claimed new committees and suchlike funded project structures were building social capital, when they were actually using and eroding existing social capital and the ways in which structures engaged with their government (Vajja and White, 2009).

The pathway of change that leads to citizens holding their governments to account (or evidence of the existence of forms of engagement that might lead to accountability) depends on the availability of specific forms of mechanisms, spaces and incentives. The interlocution process is about how best to work at both engagement/dialogue and finding appropriate incentives for V&A within these platforms and spaces. Furthermore, as shown in the case studies, access to these voices and ways of holding government to account are tied to an understanding of representations such as symbols and other forms of cultural, social and political citizen identities in use in a given context. The next section discusses the analytical framework that emerges from this discussion for use in developing CV&A ToCs grounded in contextual dynamics.

4.   The analytical framework: using PEA with OM

Using various case studies from the Mwananchi programme, Sections 2 and 3 established that CV&A pathways of change involve specific mechanisms or platforms where engagement happens. These pathways also involve dealing with diverse actor incentives and interests that manifest themselves at the different citizen–state interface arenas. These incentives and interests are shaped significantly within the prevailing forms of citizenship and how they get played out through cultural symbols and language, and the type of state.

Therefore, in order to find and support the required interlocution of citizen–state relations towards strengthened citizen engagement, so as to hold governments to account, CV&A programme teams need to do two things. First, they need to find what makes appropriate engagement mechanisms or platforms and appropriate incentives for citizens, interlocutors and state actors in order for V&A changes to happen through these platforms. These mechanisms and incentives will be specific to the issues their programme or projects are seeking to change and to the contexts in which interventions are taking place. They then need to find organisations able to work in these relationships by providing appropriate platforms/mechanisms and then incentivising appropriate actions of citizens and states.

This has to happen while also bearing in mind the fact that interlocution as a process is also a variable attribute that cannot simply be declared on certain organisations or individuals by fiat. Therefore, programme teams have to explore which actions and hence organisations or aspects of organisations make successful interlocution or change around the specific issues on which change is sought. This too will likely differ from one context to another. This suggests that pathways of change in CV&A projects are complex, context-dependent and dynamic in various dimensions. In order to establish them systematically, there is a need for a robust methodology that combines analysis and learning in the design and implementation of CV&A programmes and projects.

In the following sub-sections, we suggest an analytical framework that might help CV&A programme teams to navigate the contextual realities as discussed and be able to explain how change happens (as in ToCs) as well as incrementally improve the quality of interventions. The starting point is to be clear about how ToCs and interventions change within the programme design and implementation dynamic.

## 4.1   Moving from broad to specific ToCs

As discussed in Section 2, CV&A interventions usually start from some kind of broadly stated ToC, as derived from either past research or experiences of organisations (donors,[29] CSOs, government, etc.) of working in the development environment in question. The challenge then becomes one of moving from this broad ToC into the deeper understanding of how change happens in a given context around specific governance issues. This is with a view to supporting interventions that can achieve the best results and do so efficiently with the resources at hand.

We suggest that CV&A programme teams aiming to get results in dynamic contextual realities need also to engage in an ongoing and iterative 'action-analysis-learning' cycle,[30] in order to be able to make sense of what is going on and intervene strategically. Figure 6 shows how specific ToCs might emerge around specific issues around an ongoing and cyclic 'action', 'analysis' and 'learning' process, with each cycle deepening the ToCs and improving results. In the subsections that follow, what goes into this cyclic process and the tools that might be useful are discussed.

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[29] Increasingly, donors now support particular outcomes or outcome-oriented outputs (e.g. enhanced service delivery and citizens' participation in decision-making) or otherwise a broadly stated logical framework with a broadly stated spread of fund allocations across outputs.

[30] This is basically an 'action-reflection' process, as well known in development programming, but with a different emphasis particular to CV&A programme dynamics.

Figure 6: Basic CV&A intervention model and ToC

As shown in Figure 6, the cyclic action reflection process helps the programme team to incrementally improve their understanding of how to get from 'here to there', focused on specific governance issues which often relate to specific policies or aspects of a single policy (e.g. access to justice for women in farming communities).

The assumption is that, as more of the issue-based ToCs emerge and are understood, programme teams will use specific moments during the programme cycle (e.g. mid-term reviews) to also look back at the overall ToC and examine its relevance. It is then possible to add or emphasise other preconditions to the main ToC that need to be taken more seriously. In the case of the Mwananchi programme, for example, a tailor-made grants system was developed to support organisations to intervene in various governance issues. This was backed by action research to explore what was working and not working as projects were being implemented. However, it was during the mid-term review reflection that they were emphasised as critical components of the ToC for the Mwananchi programme and therefore added to the list of outputs.

In the sub-sections below, we discuss analysis[31] (as one of the elements of the CV&A intervention model in Figure 6). Ongoing analysis is often the weakest intervention element in development projects. However, whereas programme teams can get away with listing project deliverables in sectors focused on tangible outputs, the same approach leads to huge leaps of faith in CV&A projects. An example of projects with tangible outputs is the provision of safe water to communities in order to reduce water-borne diseases; a non-tangible change in power relations could be enabling women to claim their rights to land ownership.[32] Good analysis, aimed at systematically understanding what is

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[31] To avoid ending up with a very long paper, the learning approach is not discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that, in Mwananchi, the framework includes separate areas of emphasis at grassroots, national and ODI levels, ODI being an implementing organisation (see Tembo, 2010 for the framework).

[32] In the case of providing boreholes to communities, the assumption is that people will consistently use the safe water from boreholes and incidence of water-borne diseases in the community will be reduced. However, it cannot just be assumed that women trained in human rights are going to claim their rights from the relevant duty bearers, unless, through a huge leap of faith, it is assumed that the political and cultural processes that impede the realisation of rights are going to also work in the

going on around a governance issue in a given context, such as projects on claiming and realising rights from duty bearers, could make a difference.

In CV&A programmes, the aim is to be able to determine appropriate mechanisms for successful citizen–state engagement (with opportunities for citizens to move on to holding their governments to account). It is also about getting to understand which citizen and state actor incentives are at work and hence which one might be useful for promoting the desired citizen actions and state responses, as discussed above. Lastly, it is about supporting interlocutors of change in these contexts rather than going for organisations simply by their names or field of expertise.

4.2   Analysing contextual dynamics at work

Given the contextual realities around what makes V&A happen, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3, we suggest five areas or interlinking layers of analysis. These might be useful for understanding the contextual dynamics in which governance interventions are located and hence inform a better evolution of issue-specific ToCs, as discussed above.[33] These layers are:

1   Analysis of the **relevant** wider country- or regional-level governance dynamics;
2   Existing narratives of change based on experiences of everyday governance;
3   Identifying interlocutors associated with a specific CV&A change project;
4   Engagement dynamics at the interface between interlocutors or citizens and state actors; and
5   Institutional patterns and decision logics associated with particular changes and actors.

Figure 7: Framework for ongoing analysis in developing CV&A ToCs

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
favour of these women. In order to turn training workshops on women's rights into realisation of the desired outcomes and impacts, a great many other interventions or changes in the context are often required.

[33] Methodologically, these layers have been derived from continuous interaction with local organisations (during project visits) and analysis of case studies from the six Mwananchi countries, in exploring what makes V&A happen as discussed in in-country governance experts reports and further analysed in this paper. Ideas from PEA, especially 'problem-driven PEA', and actor-oriented approaches informed the theoretical thought process behind the interrogation of projects during project visits and also case study design and interpretation of data. The idea here is that these areas of citizen–state interactions constitute 'game-changing' areas and therefore form a good focus of analysis for programme managers and stakeholders as they design, implement and evaluate CV&A projects and accordingly refine ToCs.

In the following sections, we explain what these layers of analysis are about. Most of the methodological suggestions are explained in Annex 1.

4.2.1 Relevant wider dynamics

This layer of analysis aims at scanning the contextual dynamics at the national and sub-regional levels that have relevance to the CV&A interventions in focus in a particular programme. Analysis is often carried out using PEA approaches that are able to capture the foundational governance factors, as well as rules of the game and the 'here and now' in the case of SCAGA, as discussed in Section 2.3. A discussion of how WGA was used in Mwananchi is provided in Annex 1.

However, most of these analyses still tend to have a better handle on foundational governance factors and rules of the game in a more 'state of' or situation analysis approach, because they tend to be expensive and hence are carried out occasionally. While they are useful for trying to identify entry points and opportunities for change, as shown in Figure 7, they are not quick and simple enough for programme teams to work with and translate into everyday governance situations that citizens and interlocutors meet.

There is a need for a context-sensitive monitoring and evaluation (M&E)-type PEA tool which can work in the form of the 'here and now', alongside the more occasional-type analysis such as the WGA, the World Governance Index (WGI), the Transparency Index and the Mo Ibrahim Index. These M&E-type PEA tools need also to have a good mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. For example, in using WGA, it was the multi-stakeholder discussions that followed the presentation of findings that were more engaging and useful for identifying the interrelationship between the formal and informal institutions than just looking at quantitative data. Respondents to the WGA questionnaire also provided many comments as explanations for their choices which could not be picked out in a survey analysis instrument. These comments could potentially be analysed systematically for themes that show relational issues between citizens and their governments and perhaps provide robust explanations for the graphs produced through quantitative analysis.

4.2.2 Understanding narratives

This layer of analysis focuses on narratives specific to the governance issue in question. Within the specific area, the analysis aims to locate narratives in the population of stakeholders involved who describe how certain outcomes (either desirable or not) come about in particular contexts. In the six Mwananchi countries, most of these narratives emerged through local organisations' and citizens' stories of how various outcomes come about around an issue (e.g. the case of bike riding in Sierra Leonean towns). They also emerged through case study write-ups that in-country researchers following grantees' work documented. This enabled the understanding of processes that produce given outcomes, as well as of the nature of citizen and state actions within these processes.

The process of accessing narratives of change produces a very rich picture of citizen–state relations and how they evolve over time. It is also within these narratives that the 'us' and 'them' lines are drawn in various places in the relationship between the society and the state. The issue then becomes one of identifying and forming patterns of processes of change (or steps of change) which could address the question, 'How does change happen in this place?' This is an important starting point for understanding how change happens (in this case, about V&A) around a specific governance issue on which interventions are being made. These narratives change in relation to new pressures, some of which emanate at the local level and some at the national level.

For example, a new government could usher in a sudden emphasis on some sectors of the economy (e.g. food security) at the cost of other essential services that affect poor people. This could then change the narratives citizens have about the state and service provision. These changes in narrative can be traced through stories as they capture the historical perspectives of 'how we find ourselves in

this situation'. The methodological challenge lies in accessing as well as interpreting what the narratives mean for the governance issue, which is discussed in Annex 1.

4.2.3 Identifying and mapping interlocutors of change

The key issue in this layer of analysis is to map the actors in a way that is hooked to the narratives of change or livelihood struggles. The purpose is to construct an actor map that helps programme teams to identify who the useful interlocutors (game-changers) of change might be within the contextual dynamic. On the side of the government, the mapping of actors points to actors who might have the authority and power to change policies or implement government actions that would move towards greater response to citizens' voices and achieving accountability. This is a different approach from identifying actors in government simply because they work within a sector in which the governance issue belongs. As discussed in Section 2, some government staff might be responsible for or work in the concerned sector(s) but not act as strategic agents of change.

Methodologically, this way of listing actors is neither academic nor imagined. The participants do not get stuck and then suddenly remember who has been left out as they struggle to ascertain what you might be expecting them to mention (there is a recurrent issue of local people giving out what visitors want to hear). This struggle and second-guessing as to who should be listed happens when the process starts by directly asking people to list the project stakeholders, as in most stakeholder mapping processes. The methodology provided in Annex 1 also shows how tools such as the Alignment, Interest and Influence Matrix (AIIM) can be used innovatively together with PEA to establish some of the incentive structures around various actors mapped on the matrix.

4.2.4 Exploring engagement dynamics

The objective for this layer of analysis is to begin to understand the behaviour associated with actors mapped out as possible interlocutors of change. Most of the behaviours (both how they are now and how the programme team thinks the actors should behave) emerge from the process of establishing existing narratives around the governance issue. Mentioning how actors are behaving in one sense also means the opposite is often not being said. It is also then possible to construct understandings of the expected ideal behaviour of the actors involved. Using OM makes this process systematic, and is discussed to a greater depth in Annex 1.

Most social accountability processes tools, such as citizen report cards (CRCs) and CBPM are focused on the behaviour of public office holders and citizens' own responsibilities. These behaviours and responsibilities often come out during interface meetings. Existing social accountability tools, therefore, present a potential source of data for systematic analysis of actor behaviour.

4.2.5 Exploring institutional patterns and decision logics

As projects are being implemented, it is possible to follow through the behaviour of interlocutors identified as useful for change during the mapping process. The focus during this layer of analysis is to establish the institutional patterns in which they are effective and where they are not, the decision logics in these institutions and their individual decision logics. This happens as the programme team is supporting certain interlocution processes over time. It is important to make observations and analyse patterns over time rather than single events because behavioural change takes time and is subject to multiple incentives, some of them operating from very different angles to those of the project. In observing over a long period, some of the coincidental, event-oriented correlations can be avoided.

It is possible to use PEA to track down stories of the actions the specific actor undertakes and then see the patterns of the decisions they make and why they make them, with what results. It is also possible to examine the circumstances under which they make the various decisions. It is then possible to form a picture of how media, for instance, makes decisions on what to put on a community radio station and why and how decisions are made regarding content, under what circumstances and how this changes from one programme to another.

The idea is for the programme team to construct the circumstances under which certain changes happen and also to deliberately reinforce (using deliberately chosen strategies) behaviours and institutional patterns that work for CV&A. In explaining the circumstances under which change happens, programme teams might also relate them to the ongoing analysis of the wider dynamics explained above. In this way, they will be able to explain either external changes that the programme can take advantage of (e.g. general elections) or how to manage risks associated with citizen engagement with wider environment changes.

4.3   Representing CV&A outcomes frameworks

The discussion above established that how V&A happens in practice is dependent on contextual dynamics which are informed by particular forms of contestations of citizenship and statehood around various governance issues. It has also been argued that a focus on providing appropriate mechanisms/ engagement platforms and incentives is what makes change happen. In the background, we must always bear in mind that interlocutors are agents who can actually change rules of the game through particular actions in the process of interlocution. This is different from using general name categories, such as 'the media', and assuming that all organisations in the category can get the job done.

The analytical model suggested seeks to enable programme teams to work around these issues as well as to refine the broad ToC into 'how change happens' around specific issues, with a possibility of revising the broad theory at the end. The model seeks to fulfil at least three purposes:

1   Draw attention to context analysis questions to be addressed at the beginning and along the way, 'from here to there';
2   Help to define what kind of actors could make a difference in the defined contexts and issues;
3   Inform the design of realistic CV&A outcomes frameworks and their logical relationship based on (1) and (2).

Figure 8 shows how the ongoing contextual analysis using PEA thinking could inform better understanding of CV&A outcomes.

In Figure 8, the coloured oval represents the wider context in which CV&A interventions take place, with the pathway of change inside, shown by strategies, outcomes and impact. As discussed earlier, ongoing context analysis in this area (as shown by the cyclic arrows) informs the development of realistic outcomes within the dynamics at work, which are presented in the middle of the diagram. When taken together, good contextual analysis that is able to inform the development of good outcomes frameworks would help in the better articulation of CV&A ToCs. It is envisaged that this journey will also incrementally improve the quality of interventions, quality of evidence for influencing relevant policies and explanations of what seems to work and not to work. The various analytical dimensions of the context have already been discussed.

The subsections below focus instead on the issue specific intervention logic itself, the 'outputs-outcomes-impacts' logic—the core element of an issue-based ToC, as also shown in Figures 6 and 7. In other words, on deciding on a governance issue (e.g. the need to increase women's access to justice in communities x and y), the outputs-outcomes-impacts logic has to be developed. This will be informed through ongoing cycles of analysis of the dynamics at work, and will be improved through a learning process approach.

Figure 8: Analytical framework for linking context analysis to intervention outcomes

Five major[34] building blocks of the outputs-outcomes-impacts logic can be defined in this process. The model further shows that, although the traditional way of representing pathways of change is to move from inputs to long-term goals, the best way to define them in CV&A (because of their complexity) is to start from the long-term goals and work backward. The backward arrow shows this deliberate attempt to work into various elements of pathways of change from the desired change and then into resources/inputs that might be required, so as to figuratively avoid prescribing activities and outputs before thinking about the change that is expected. As indicated in introduction of this paper, ToCs for CV&A projects require both forward-looking interventions and a robust retrospective analysis ('How did we get here?').

The _first_ building block is the goal of the CV&A programme. In most CV&A log-frames, goals are drawn largely from country context analyses such as the Freedom House Index, the WGI and the Transparency Index. Therefore, in the framework above, it is the assessment of the relevant wider context dynamics that will inform the setting of programme or project goals. However, as discussed earlier, these macro analyses often tend to be good at articulating the national level issues and are weaker on the grassroots and sub-national level issues where most civil society and media organisations tend to locate their CV&A projects. There is hence often a need for linking the macro analyses to sub-national and grassroots analyses[35], and monitor the contextual dynamics at these levels, often through a sector specific approach in order to minimise costs. In terms of the specific programmes or projects being drawn in within these wider contexts, OM would improve the setting of realistic programme or project

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[34] Depending on the issue and hence the change required, the actual number of elements in the logical chain might be more than shown above. They will be formed around the defined major building blocks, however.

[35] A good example of tools that are being tried for sub-national level analysis is the Local Governance Barometer, which has been designed and is promoted by IDASA, SNV, PACT and Impact Alliance. At the grassroots level, an example of analysis is the African monitor, which is experimenting with the Grassroots Focus Index, in order to assess grassroots influence on development policies and priorities.

goals. This is because OM focuses on the vision of stakeholders of a particular programme or project. The vision for Radio Ada[36] in Mwananchi Ghana, for example, is as follows:

> A well informed community progressively engaged in decision-making on all rights issues affecting them, including Songor, where leaders are more transparent and accountable thereby creating a harmonious environment for prosperity and peace. This will result in a community that communicates and interacts directly with duty bearers and traditional authorities, capable of resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner. Community resources will be managed in an open, transparent and participatory manner, with elected representatives and traditional leaders ready to interact. Resources will be managed in a sustainable and conflict free manner.

The _second_ building block in the model is what is labelled 'intermediate CV&A changes', which are normally reflected as 'purpose statements' in log-frames. In a PEA-informed analysis (as shown in the diagram above), these changes would also be articulated from the narrative analysis. For example, MADEN in Uganda formed the intermediate change as 'Increase child enrolment, retention and better performance of children at public exams at the six primary schools in the selected sub-counties of Kimengo and Miirya (see full text of narrative in Annex 1). The expected change in this case is put in terms of the concrete changes the project is to achieve. The stated changes may refer to a system or to the behaviour of organisations or people, or be manifested as changed conditions for beneficiaries (i.e. situational data).

The narrative analysis can lead to identification of several outcome areas.[37] Interventions will be aiming to achieve each of these outcomes (or necessary preconditions) so the programme can contribute to the achievement of the goal. As part of the iterative learning process, the combination of these outcome areas or how they are approached could change (e.g. other outcome areas could be introduced, dropped or refocused so they are more specific than before). The change in the narratives that are emerging from citizens and state actors around a particular governance issue (e.g. change in media content or an issue being dropped from the media hot list) over time is in itself an indicator of change. This can lead to refining some of the elements the expected intermediate outcomes of a CV&A project; or if too radical, it can lead to re-thinking the ToC.

The third building block of the output-outcomes logic refers to 'improved behaviours of strategic state and non-state actors'—the game-changers necessary to achieving the specific outcomes (necessary preconditions) discussed above. The cyclic PEA process will inform the selection of the necessary interlocution and interlocutors of change in a particular context. As discussed in the earlier sections of the paper, the starting point is often that these actors are often identified as 'potential game changers' because of their position in the governance arena of the issue in question. Some work has to be done to influence them so that they actually work to change rules of the game. The pathway of change will therefore will be focused on these actors, in terms of how they need to behave in order to deliver change. The reference to 'Actor A', 'Actor B', 'Actor AB', 'Actor CFM', etc in the diagram, suggests that whereas in most cases these actors might be thought of as individual people or organisations. However, the everyday governance reality is that they also have to be thought of in terms of how they behave or need to behave when they are working together. The WGA study in all countries, for instance,

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[36] The Ada area is home to one of the most important natural salt-producing lagoons in Ghana, the Songor. This resource has been at the heart of the Ada people's identity since pre-colonial times. In fact, ownership and control of this resource have been the subject of the only major wars the Adas, and other Dangbes, ever fought, with the most prominent of these being the defeat of the Ashanti at Katamansu. The issue of the control of this resource has continued to be a critical concern for the Ada people, not only because it is the main source of livelihoods for a vast majority of Dangbe people but also because it occupies an important place in the spiritual identity of the people. Yet, during colonial and subsequent independent times, control of the salt produced by the Songor has been an issue of contention with state central administrations and between different elements of the traditional leadership of the Adas.

[37] In the case of MADEN, for example, the three outcome areas (or preconditions for the ToC) were 1) Increased community participation in school governance processes with meaningful involvement to enhance and improve children's learning outcomes; 2) a platform that empowers children to understand and demand their educational rights; and 3) mechanisms for influencing government policies on the attainment of quality and relevant education for all children through networks, alliances and critical engagement. The Mwananchi programme also started with three preconditions (sharpening institutional role of interlocutors, achieving synergies and use of research-based evidence).

showed that whereas media and civil society would influence change on their own, they were often difficulties in having them work together to build synergies around their individual comparative advantages, as assumed in the Mwananchi ToC. There were also difficulties in relations between CSOs and members of parliament.

This focus on the behaviour of state or non-state actors associated with making change happen from this perspective could benefit from OM as a methodology. In OM, the expected ideal behaviours around specific actors are called outcome challenges (OCs).[38] The argument is that it is when interlocutors, whom the programme has sought to influence, are behaving at their best or towards their best behaviour[39] then the programme will be at its full potential in terms of achieving transformative change. It should be noted that it is citizens as well as public office holders and interlocutors that are all on the pathway of change, pursued here through a focus on interlocutors. This is a key point of departure from the logical framework, which focuses on achieving activity-based outputs.

It is realised in CV&A types of changes, as discussed above, that actor behaviour is central in enabling change to happen, and yet the behavioural aspects of outputs are often not shown explicitly (Holland et al., 2009). Instead of simply including another step to log-frames that focuses on the behaviour of actors, and hence addresses the 'leap of faith' between outputs and outcomes, as Holland et al suggest, the model above draws on OM principles and makes actor behaviour a critical building block of change. Governance is about actor relationships and behavioural interactions. Actors' behaviour(s) is identified and understood during PEA-led context analysis through exploring 'engagement dynamics' among key actors, as discussed above.

Box 5: Example of an OC

The programme intends to see local communities that recognise the importance of, and engage in, the planning of resource management activities in partnership with other resource users in their region. These communities have gained the trust of the other members of the partnership and the recognition of government officials so that they can contribute constructively to debates and decision-making processes. They are able to clearly plan and articulate a vision of their forest management activities and goals that is relative to their context and needs. They call on external technical support and expertise as appropriate. They act as champions for model forest concepts in their communities and motivate others in the partnership to continue their collaborative work.

Source: Outcome Mapping Manual –Earl, et al (2001).

The <u>fourth</u> building block of the outputs-outcomes pathway model is about developing appropriate strategies for change. It is these strategies that are inclusive of strategic forms of activities and outputs that can deliver change. As learnt from the discussion in sections 2 and 3 of this paper (and hence shown in the diagram above), strategies include those aimed at creating mechanisms for dialogical interface between state actors, citizens and interlocutors; supporting game changing behaviour of strategic actors on both state and citizen sides; providing incentives for change[40] (e.g. providing strategic information to citizens so that they can hold government to account); and creating enabling environments for successful citizen engagement (e.g. supporting freedom of information laws or finding ways to promote political will for certain forms of citizen engagement). These strategies, and how they are linked (strategy maps in OM), lay out what the programme is trying to do to influence change among interlocutors and other strategic partners. Informed by OM, a strategy map is created for each outcome challenge.[41]

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[38] These ideal behaviours or outcomes are the challenge for the programme to make happen through a progressive transformation process during the course of project implementation.

[39] The movement towards the ideal behaviour and the complexity in this transformation of actor behaviour is reflected in what PMs in OM.

[40] Among the incentives that are being tried out in Mwananchi, is promotion of the use of research-based evidence by civil society, media and elected representatives. This is being explored within the politics of relations among these actors and with policy-makers; and hence the need to understand what kinds of research-based evidence incentivises and contributes to policy change, and under what circumstances.

[41] A good strategy map gives a clear and concrete description of the strategies, roles and responsibilities that can be assumed by the project. This includes definitions of the outputs the programme can provide to partners. A precise definition of project strategies (activities and outputs) facilitates annual operational planning. Strategies should be examined yearly in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency.

The focus on strategies rather than exact activities and outputs is also because, in the area of CV&A, most of the ToC is emergent and the theory of action (how to support movement towards these changes) is also mostly iterative rather than predefined, as discussed earlier. The more flexibility provided in the making of choices given to the actors directly involved in the action, the better they might become at trying out various strategies to influence change. In other words, the exact list of activities and inputs needs to be articulated and listed as part of strategic actions required in a particular contextual dynamic rather than copied from a project done in the past.

It is in this aspect of the output-outcomes pathway model that the analysis of institutional patterns and decision logics (as shown in the context analysis cycle) of various strategic actors in the change process becomes useful. With a better understanding of how MPs make decisions, for example, it would be possible for CORD Sierra Leone, which is engaging the MP to help in changing mining rules, to know if it is useful to focus on the single MP or to work with political parties in Sierra Leone. CORD could invest more in strategies to influence political parties than in single MPs, who also often require high meeting attendance fees in most countries.

The building blocks, discussed above, need to have associated objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) for measuring change in order for the ToCs to be complete. The goal and intermediate outcomes result areas can be measured using traditional log-frame indicators. However, the element of 'behaviour of strategic state and non-state actors' needs to be measured through progress markers (PMs) around the defined OCs for each actor or interlocutor. PMs are already put in a step-wise pyramid of change starting from 'Expect to see' (an early response to the programme's basic activities), 'Like to see' (active engagement) and, ultimately, 'Love to see' (transformative actions). This measurement is better than using log-frame indicators, which often only reflect the final PMs ('Love to see' level). They disregard a great many earlier behavioural changes that could be achieved by the project and could hence motivate both the key actors of change and programme managers.

The development of these PMs and OVIs should be informed by analysis of the contextual dynamics at work. Such analysis might suggest that the generation of certain forms of data during elections, for example, might lead to erroneous data being provided. This is because political parties are likely to either use or hide such data if they are closely associated with winning or losing elections. In Ethiopia, for example, the generation of data for the WGA study was heavily politicised, because the survey of perceptions was happening during the election year. The coordinating organisation had to devise other ways of collecting information in order to increase validity and reduce misinterpretation of results.

The measurements applied to assessing strategies (which are inclusive of inputs and outputs) aim to assess the level of 'effort' by the programme team, whereas those applied to 'Behavioural changes' and 'Intermediate outcomes' assess the effectiveness of interventions. In other words, the programme is assessing the extent to which changes in the behaviour of key actors are resulting in the desired results of the programme, besides the changed behaviours themselves. Changes in behaviour are both a means and an end in CV&A projects.

All these measurements of change and results are interpreted against the contextual dynamics, which are also being analysed all the time, as shown in the model. This enables programmes teams not to fixate on comparing numbers: numbers produced in one context might not be related fairly to numbers obtained in a different context (e.g. change of government) even if the intervention remains the same. The only exception might be where interventions were perfectly randomised for impact evaluation during the design stage. The idea of achieving a good randomisation of interventions in CV&A interventions is, however, still debatable because of the complexity of the citizen-state power relations involved.

The fifth and last building block of the intervention logic (not shown in the diagram in order to avoid overcrowding it with terms) is the management of *risks and assumptions*. A simpler way of representing risks and assumptions in the model is to relate risks to what happens between intervention logic and

the wider environment (the coloured part of the oval shape); and assumptions to what happens between the links of the intervention chain of change. This is because *risks* refer to contextual factors, which have the potential to impede change but cannot be influenced by the project and are hence stated in the form of negative statements. In the model above, these risks can be assessed as part of the contextual dynamics and also better explained than in the traditional risk analysis and management models[42]. In CVA types of change, the analysis of the dynamics in these external risks would help programme teams to manage external risks more intentionally. This would be in ways that are not just about mitigation, as in 'avoidance' of battles but being able to pre-empt these eminent battles (looking at the way they change over time) and indirectly shifting them towards positive change.

Assumptions, on the other hand, refer to necessary conditions that need to be met in order for the change to happen, but ones over which the programme does not have direct control. As a result assumptions are set as positive statements, because the programme has to have confidence that there is a greater likelihood that they will hold true. Otherwise, if they are unlikely to happen then they are best set as risks or 'killer assumptions' and therefore are not good design assumptions. Assumptions are in essence part of the issue-specific intervention logic, except for the lack of project management control, and hence are embedded and explained as part of the envisaged chain of change. This applies to broad (e.g. assuming that an increasing level of information flow empowers citizens to engage in accessing public goods); and issue-specific ToC levels (e.g. assuming that a change in the by-law regarding youth participation will increase their access to credit).

The problem, however, is that there are two types of assumptions that seem to be conflated into one type in LFAs. The first type involves conditions that lie beyond project control and can clearly not be influenced (e.g. rainfall patterns or results of a general election) and second are conditions that could be influenced (e.g. the reinforcement of legislation on youth employment so that youths can have access to loans). It is, for instance, possible to influence the behaviour of members of parliament so that that they influence either a push for compliance with the legislation or reform the legislation so that it is at the level where it can properly inform practice. The decision is nevertheless context dependent, so that a good context analysis would help decide between those factors that can be directly influenced and those that cannot be influenced by the programme. This also helps to test the assumptions before a specific project CV&A ToC can be developed.

In this model, PEA would help with risk analysis (especially assessing political risks) while OM would help programme teams to deal with the specific intervention assumptions through focusing on factors or actors that could be influenced. This is because OM recognises factors that lie beyond the control of project teams but could be influenced by focusing on the behaviour of the actors involved. This sometimes means thinking about a chain of social network actors; one influencing another until the ultimate change is realised. In other words, OM enables programme teams to set in motion a deliberate process of identifying and articulating what happens in the sphere of influence. This happens through the process of identifying actors with whom the project team is working with directly (or able to work with directly) and focusing on influencing these actors, who can then influence their own boundary actors in order for change to happen. In other words, instead of lumping everything into the 'assumptions' column in a log-frame and not offering explanations on how they are being dealt with, OM makes assumptions a key point of focus. This happens through bringing 'the sphere of influence' into play as a critical area in the path of change.

In the end, an iterative PEA-informed 'action-analysis-learning process' being used to work out OM-formed pathways of change would be sharper at dealing with contextual dynamics; would improve the intervention logic through a focus on behavioural elements of CVA outputs; systematically deal with risks and assumptions as critical areas of intervention; and ultimately lead to better ToCs for CV&A programmes.

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[42] In this case, instead of generically assessing the probability of occurrence of the risk and capacity of the project team to mitigate against the risk (see discussion on this in Ortengren, 2004), it is possible to use the context analysis model to deepen the analysis by assessing the way the specific risk occurs, which actors are involved, and how they tend to make decisions that reinforce the trend of events.

5.   Conclusion

This paper aims to explain the steps that can be taken to develop ToCs that address questions of 'what works or does not work and under what circumstances', on the path to achieving immediate, intermediate and long-term results in CV&A projects. The starting point in such projects is often broad theory and assumptions as to how change happens: it is not possible to develop a specific 'off-the-shelf–and-run-with-it' ToC that is useful in different contexts. The ToCs that are appropriate for CV&A programmes and projects are largely emergent and transformative in nature. They should hence be subjected to a continuous process of construction and deconstruction, to improve knowledge on what works and does not work and the circumstances under which these changes take place. The hope is that repeated cycles of action and reflection, while challenging previously held assumptions among project teams and partners, will also improve ways of working in different contexts and hence the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of interventions.

The innovative part of this logic of developing ToCs for CV&A programmes and projects is discussed using OM and PEA. A particular way of using PEA with OM processes is suggested, to deepen our understanding of the behaviour of key actors in the project and how they are situated in the ongoing dynamic of actor incentives and interests, both specific to the project and in the wider political environment in which the CV&A project is being implemented. This approach is in itself a ToC, but one which sets a desired outcome; in this case a situation where there is evidence of citizen voice contributing to state accountability and responsiveness. The approach then lays on the table a framework of analysis for how to move from here to this end. It is envisaged that the model provided would enable thinking about results from the start of the programme, and also lay down ToCs that embrace the dynamics at work as part of the change that is measured and explained, as part of the monitoring and evaluation framework.

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Annex 1: Tools for analysing dynamics at work in CV&A programmes

Using the WGA to analyse country context

The WGA focuses on how different sections of society perceive the political process (in terms of how rules are formally and informally applied in action at the broader political process level). In order to do this, the architects of WGA (Hyden et al., 2007) identify six arenas of citizen–state interactions. The assumption is that issues tend to emanate from citizens and are aggregated through various political institutions before being decided on and implemented by relevant public authorities. These arenas (or functional categories of society and government, which interact in different forms) include: civil society (where citizens become aware of and may raise issues for the attention of public authorities); political society (where issues are aggregated by political parties and legislatures); government (where the stewardship of the system as a whole tends to lie); the bureaucracy (where policies are prepared and implemented); economic society (where relations between the state and the market are determined); and the judiciary (where disputes are settled).

The tool also uses six governance principles, drawn mainly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: participation (degree of ownership and involvement stakeholders have in the political system); fairness (degree to which rules are perceived as applying equally to everyone in society regardless of background); decency (degree to which rules are formed and handled without humiliating or harming particular groups of people); accountability (extent to which political actors are seen as acting responsibly and responsively in relation to their constituents); transparency (extent to which decisions are perceived as being made in a clear and open manner); and efficiency (extent to which limited human and financial resources are seen as being used prudently). The general approach to categorising these principles is that the first three pertain to the way public officials interact with citizens, whereas the last three refer to how they behave in office. The behaviour of public officials affects citizens indirectly: for instance, in environments where public officials do not disclose key information for decision-making, it is difficult for civil society to engage with them effectively.

The arenas and principles taken together have been used to produce 36 WGA indicators. These have in turn informed the development of a standard questionnaire which is administered among sampled informants, identified from the arenas indicated above, called 'well-informed persons' (WIPs). Focusing on WIPs as interviewees rather than on ordinary citizens *per se* is (the authors argue) occurs because pre-tests conducted during the piloting of the tool demonstrated that ordinary citizens rarely demonstrated enough knowledge or comfort to assess systemic governance issues such as those this survey includes. However, this also constitutes the major weakness of the tool: grassroots-level everyday governance realities are missed by focusing on the perceptions of seemingly 'elite' individuals in society. There is need for another WGA tool to amass knowledge of governance at the grassroots to sub-national level, to synthesise analytically with that gathered at the national level. The major limitation to such a twin-track approach would be its cost.

Within the WIP approach as is currently understood, 10 WIP categories have been identified, so as to make it possible to get the views of as broad a range of relevant stakeholders: 1) government; 2) civil servants; 3) legislators; 4) lawyers, including judges; 5) media representatives; 6) religious groups; 7), business people; 8) academics; 9) representatives of CSOs, including trade unions; and 10) officials in international organisations—as shown in the matrix in Table A1.

Table A1: WGA matrix of governance arenas and principles

Principle/ Arena	Participation	Fairness	Decency	Accountability	Transparency	Efficiency
Civil society	1. Freedom of association	2. Society free from discrimination	3. Freedom of expression	4. Respect for governing rules	5. Freedom of the media	6. Input in policy making
Political society	7. Legislature representative of society	8. Policy reflects public preferences	9. Peaceful competition for political power	10. Legislators accountable to public	11. Transparency of political parties	12. Efficiency of legislative function
Government	13. Intra-governmental consultation	14. Adequate standard of living	15. Personal security of citizens	16. Security forces subordinated to civilian government	17. Government provides accurate information	18. Efficiency of executive branch
Bureaucracy	19. Civil servants' shape policy	20. Equal opportunities to public services	21. Civil servants respectful towards citizens	22. Civil servants accountable	23. Civil service decision-making transparent	24. Merit-based system for recruitment
Economic society	25. Private sector consulted on policy	26. Regulations equally applied	27. Government's respect private property rights	28. regulating private sector to protect workers	29. Transparency in international trade policy	30. Interventions free from corruption
Judiciary	31. Non-formal processes of conflict resolution	32. Equal access to justice for all citizens	33. Human rights incorporated in national practice	34. Judicial officers held accountable	35. Clarity in administering justice	36. Efficiency of the judicial system

In order to address some of the weaknesses inherent in the WGA, the Mwananchi programme included interviewee samples from both the national and the sub-national level (e.g. MPs represented national actors under 'elected representatives', and councillors represented sub-national actors), as long as they had demonstrated knowledge of both levels. Other components, given Mwananchi assumptions of how V&A happens, were questions to help explore the aspects of policy (agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and M&E) in which civil society actors were engaging; and the prevalent forms of relationships among main interlocutors of citizen–state relations (media, elected representatives and CSOs). This approach still missed chiefs and family clans, which play important roles in Africa's governance institutions, despite decades of colonisation and domination by the modern state.

It is important to underline here that no one tool can lead to data that can provide answers to all questions. Whereas the discussion above leads to a preference for tools that help to establish the governance context as the 'rules in use', in practice other tools, such as the WGI, the Mo Ibrahim Index, the Freedom House Index, etc., might add other dimensions to these insights. This means the programme needs to develop strong scanning mechanisms to ensure that reports from these other sources can be used to inform future activities. Overall, the emphasis needs to be on contextual dynamics and actors that are real game-changers (interlocutors) within these dynamics.

It is important to look for issues that are significantly shaping the operational dynamics of the formal and informal rules of the game around policy debates as they are played out in the media, in research documents and in other spaces that exist in a country. It is these issues that are likely to directly affect how particular citizen voices could make a difference to how the state responds and becomes accountable. There is need for a context-sensitive M&E-type PEA tool that can work in the form of the 'here and now' that SCAGA uses, alongside the more occasional-type analysis such as the WGA, the WGI, the Transparency Index and the Mo Ibrahim Index.

Using everyday governance narratives to identify the specific change being sought

The intermediate outcomes in governance projects are normative and qualitative in nature (e.g. change in power relations or increased budget transparency). This also means that it is difficult for outsiders to capture what the various experiences mean to citizens and local organisations in the situation in question and what they are doing about it.

In essence, what is often labelled a 'change in power relations', etc., in CV&A project log-frames and reports pertains more to the meanings that project managers and stakeholders give to the experiences of the local actors they are supporting and observing than to what the same things mean to these citizens and local organisations. This conflict of meanings alone can become an impediment to understanding the pathways of change in CV&A projects. This is because, for citizens and their organisations, these meanings of their various project and non-project encounters are part and parcel of their expression of their dynamic citizenship identities. The meanings they form are linked closely to their empowerment, which then leads to certain types of actions rather than others.

The Mwananchi programme has so far shown that encouraging local organisations and citizens to provide various narratives of their experiences around the governance issue they are concerned with provides some depth of meaning to what local organisations' and citizens' projects mean to them. In this case, local organisations and citizens situate their narratives within their cultural, social and political norms of engagement. This often involves the use of symbols and other important postures that provide meaning in themselves, rather than just words, which is key to understanding how V&A happens, as discussed earlier.

The process of accessing narratives of change produces a very rich picture of citizen–state relations and how they have evolved over time, with the local organisation itself finding where it belongs in this story. In locating a specific CV&A project within the story of change, these local actors emerge with elements of ToCs, including how they think change could happen, given a whole set of past experiences, with both its enabling and constraining moments and the various actors involved. The issue then becomes enriching these ToCs through a systematic and dialogical process of establishing the expected outcome(s), the assumptions on which they are based and some of the interventions that are in local organisations' and citizens' minds, as necessary for achieving outcomes; and some of what they consider indicators of change on the way to achieving outcomes.

For example, MADEN went through a process of narrating the story and, with facilitation from Development Training and Research (DRT), developed what it called the ToC[43] for the programme. The narrative contains a history and an understanding of the problem and who is involved in it, as well as several other issues that reflect on the Uganda government in terms of its education policies and behaviour, and then a statement that reflects the core theory, indicators of change and assumptions.

In the example in Box A1, the broad ToC can be identified from the narrative, 'effective involvement of the above stakeholders will **positively influence child enrolment, retention and better performance of learners** in public exams at least in the six primary schools in the selected sub-counties of Kimengo and Miirya'. This, taken together with the preconditions identified (in the form of listed outcomes) and the indicators provide some of the critical elements of the ToC (see Act Knowledge and Aspen Institute, 2004). However, it is also noticeable that what makes MADEN believe this will happen and why (a set of assumptions) is not stated—although programme managers can easily explore this through further verbal discussions or written communication. These assumptions are often unstated but citizens and their organisations have them because they are based on their lived experience of what is working and why, which is inherent in their experiences.

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[43] It should be noted, however, that it is not common at the local level to find organisations which articulate a change process as a ToC. In normal situations, it is researchers (such as ODI researchers) who use dialogical discussions to establish what could be called a ToC. Otherwise, the best one can often find is a log-frame that represents some elements of ToCs.

Box A1: MADEN's narrative of change

MADEN is an umbrella organisation of CSOs doing work related to education in Masindi district in Uganda and fully registered with the national NGO Board. As a local and district-based education network, MADEN was founded in 2005 with the aim of coordinating CSOs working on education and influencing education authorities to deliver quality education to all children in Masindi district. It does this through mobilisation of stakeholders and CSOs to actively participate in education policy formulation and implementation in an effort to realise education for all. Currently, the network has a membership of 33 CSOs including international, national, local and community-based organisations. The vision is 'Equal opportunities and universal access to relevant and quality education for all in Masindi district'. The aim is to improve access to quality education in primary schools in Masindi by enhancing the involvement of all key education stakeholders including parents, teachers, pupils, government leaders, the media, education NGOs and elected leaders in the school governance process. MADEN strongly believes that effective involvement of the above stakeholders will **positively influence child enrolment, retention and better performance of learners** in public exams at least in the six primary schools in the selected sub-counties of Kimengo and Miirya.

Outcomes or preconditions:
• Increased community participation in school governance processes with meaningful involvement to enhance and improve children's learning outcomes;
• Availability of a platform that empowers children to understand and demand their educational rights;
• Availability of mechanisms for influencing government policies on the attainment of quality and relevant education for all children through networks, alliances and critical engagement.

Change indicators:
• Empowered parents holding the school management structures and elected leaders accountable and supporting children's learning through regular school monitoring and meetings;
• Improved enrolment, retention, completion rates and better performance at the national examination level;
• Children's ability to demand better education service delivery;
• Empowered community demanding better education services.

Source: Tumwesige Walter, MADEN Programme Officer.

Mapping of interlocutors involved in the CVA project

The other key observation from the example of MADEN is a number of actors are mentioned in the process of producing the narrative. Some of these actors are already listed or mentioned in the initial ToC by the organisation. However, the various actor interests and incentives that impede the realisation of outcomes in the first place are not stated explicitly. This is important for CV&A projects to explore because of their focus on changing relationships between citizens and their governments. Otherwise, the ToC from the narrative looks like an easy formula of bringing together the mentioned actors which will lead to change happening, which is unlikely to be the case in real life situations.

In the MADEN case, interactions between pupils and teachers, for instance, already inhabit understandings of what the 'pupil' category means to pupils themselves and hence how they can present themselves or be represented in order to hold teachers to account. This also relates to what it means to be a 'teacher' in this society, which will inform how teachers respond to 'pupils', across various forms of representation. The same goes for parents, SMCs, the Education Department and education NGOs. All these categories are likely to engage from certain positions on what 'pupils' and their issues mean (forming part of their interests and the kind of incentives that might work and not work for change to happen). This forms a critical part of how change will happen in this context. This second layer of analysis is therefore about mapping the actors systematically and the kind of analysis necessary in order to learn about their interests and incentives for engaging in a specific issue.

When the mapping of actors is done in a way that is hooked to stories of change or livelihood struggles, this makes the listing of actors neither academic nor imagined. The participants do not get stuck and then suddenly remember who has been left out as they struggle to ascertain what you might be expecting them to mention. This struggle and second-guessing of who should be listed happens when the process starts by directly asking people to list the project stakeholders, as is done in most stakeholder mapping processes.

For the purposes of analysis, the Mwananchi programme developed a procedure of mapping actors being mentioned in the stories into two categories of relevance to thinking about CV&A change processes. These categories are citizens/community and government,[44] and whether they are located at the grassroots or the sub-national or national level in the governance structure of the country, as shown in Figure A1. In each country, the actual mapping followed the governance structure as defined in the country. For example, in Uganda the governance structure is LC1-LC5 (local councils from village through parish, sub-County and county levels up to district level); the Ethiopia governance structure starts with the *kibele* at the grassroots level, then up through *woreda*, zone and regional state to federal state at the top.

The other conceptual consideration is that the different governance structures used in the mapping of government actors are based on the constitutional acts of the various countries and therefore different frameworks should be used for enabling citizen voice and state accountability. They are also influenced by party politics in different ways, as ruling regimes attempt to engage with populations as both citizens and electorates. This way of mapping therefore purposefully provides for an understanding of how formal institutions work or do not work for enhancing V&A. The argument is that, given that CV&A is about strengthening government responsiveness and accountability, how demand-side initiatives contribute to this process should be a critical component of the ToC. Figure A1 shows how the actor

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[44] It is realised, however, that these categories might be simplistic in themselves because there are many interactions between communities and state actors such that, in certain cases, someone who is being said to be acting for the state (e.g. a nurse because of being paid under a government ministry) might in practice be acting as a member of the community. They might perceive themselves as acting as champions of the causes of the community they are working in rather than for the government that pays them. Similarly, some 'community members' might also appear more 'government' in their actions than community members, perhaps because they aspire to join the ruling party and in most African contexts the ruling party and government are often one institution in practice. It is therefore important to be aware of the functional roles around specific actors and approach them accordingly rather than sticking rigidly with formal categorisations. It is through their functional roles that they operate in everyday governance and hence contribute to change (negative or positive).

mapping process was facilitated conceptually in different countries where the Mwananchi programme operates.

Figure A1: Actor categories in a social mapping exercise

As shown in Figure A1,[45] organisations implementing CV&A projects tend to develop strategies that involve organising communities and interlocutors. These organisations then attempt to relate to other actors that will leverage community efforts towards achieving the desired change.

For example, parents, teachers and students associations (PTSAs) in Ethiopia organise around students and teachers in schools. However, because of the nature of change these PTSAs are looking for, that is, improving the quality of education by raising the qualification and general competence of teachers in schools, they need to engage with government officials at levels higher than the school in order to bring about policy changes that could positively affect the schools where they are organised. At the level of the school, the only engagement they can meaningfully make is with teachers, and yet it is these teachers whose quality they would like to improve. In some cases, teachers at the school level do not have enough authority and power to influence their own ministry at the *woreda*, zonal and federal government level. PTSAs therefore have reached an agreement with the Teachers Association, which has institutional presence (by way of a registration licence to operate as a governance entity, which PTSAs do not have) at the *woreda*, zone, regional state and federal level to work on education demands for policies that could improve the quality of education.

These alliances, as exemplified here, are often based on creating win-win situations for the various actors who have their own specific interest in the issue. In the Ethiopia case, for example, the Teachers Association has issues it would like changed for which it needs to engage with parents. It has therefore agreed to facilitate the PTSAs' engagement with government at various levels so that it also can gain more access to parents and communities on the issues of its interest. As exemplified in Box 4 in the

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[45] Each of the figures reflects engagement strategies towards intermediate and long-term results because these are at the centre of what organisations involved in CV&A projects are looking for throughout the project implementation process.

main text, it is through such grassroots-to-national linkages that Zambian civil society and media managed to hold up an education bill to ensure it properly included education for deaf children.

The mapping process also includes how community-based organisations engage with or at various levels of government.[46] The linkages are not as neat as, for instance, citizens or their community-based organisations being able to engage with LC1 or ADCs and VDCs, while the higher-level networks engage with the sub-national and national level government, in a horizontal way. Although this does tend to be the common pattern, there are also many cases of individual citizens and community-based organisations engaging at a much higher level of the government structure. What is important is the existence of other forms of relationships they can use to engage at the targeted level of government. This may be through having been at school with a government actor, or belonging to the same ethnic group, religion or social network. The exact factor that is important in these engagement relationships differs from country to country.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the actor map and linkages that the organisation working on mining came up with included the first lady (the president's wife) as an influential actor who was better placed to enable change in mining policies in favour of youths. The organisation said that this was because the first lady came from the same area and youths knew her parents and hence had strong connections with her. They also know that the first lady influenced government policies through her husband and about the official and unofficial roles that have the inherent power of the president behind them. This makes working through the first lady more likely to deliver change than trying to work through the bureaucracy and get to the responsible minister officially responsible for the issue.

In Ethiopia, there is such a strong ethnic bond that associations such as Gurage Development Association (GDA) can call on their own people located at various levels of government to assist them to link with appropriate people in government and get information appropriate to their needs. As a result, Gurage clan members can engage at various levels of government depending on the presence of their own clan in such spaces and achieve the results they desire, which perhaps other clans might not be able to. This is taken into consideration when mapping actors from grassroots to national level and vice versa, where specific actors are concerned. The good thing is that the different Ethiopian clans are recognised in the constitution, from a position of enhancing local pride rather than discrimination.[47]

It should be noted, however, that if the same thing happened in Ghana, Malawi or Zambia, it would carry strong nepotistic images, such that it is safer for people at various levels of government to stay clear of helping their own clan. The constitutions of these countries are built on notions of unity (e.g. One Zambia, One Nation). This, however, does not mean that ethnic discrimination does not happen in these countries, but that it happens in other more sophisticated and informal ways. The WGA showed very low scores on meritocracy in these countries, for instance, implying that employment patterns in these countries are based very little on merit.

In practice, the actor mapping exercise also ends up with a group of actors seen to be related neither to the community nor to the government but regarded as the necessary interlocutors of change, for example the media and some NGO-type CSOs. In Zambia, after a prolonged debate, the stakeholders who were doing the mapping agreed to put these media and NGO actors on the side of the community because it was argued that they were meant to serve citizen interests. However, this was also a reality

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[46] The concepts of 'community' and 'government' are used to suggest 'collective action' in either case (in citizen actions and policy processes, respectively). However, in reality, it is important to bear in mind that there could be caveats to this formulation. The first is that the actors in each case might to a large extent share a common understanding of the situation at hand and might agree tacitly on the course of action to take, especially in dealing with external actors. However, in reality, this might not always hold true, as some actors might start trying to gain advantage of the situation for their private benefit and thereby weaken collective action. Second, the categories suggest common orientations and categorisations of things and people. However, in everyday life, they can act differently from others and disrupt what might have been a suggested pathway of change (see Long, 2001, for a deeper discussion).

[47] The constitution, according to its preamble, is a covenant which is entered into by every nationality of the country based on their right to self-determination, not only by the ethnic groups for whom the nine regional states are established but also by the various ethnic groups found within each regional state.

check in terms of how the professional (rather than membership of community-based) civil society and media organisations are perceived by local organisations.

The media and several other actors have nevertheless remained debatable actors in this mapping process, with some organisations placing them on the government side because they argue that, for instance, a media organisation serves the interests of the state more than the interests of citizens (e.g. most state broadcasters). These debates help the process in that discussions often start by using generic categories, which are not as useful for thinking about specific issues and actions, and go on to specific actors (e.g. from media as a category to radio and print). The most useful way to approach these actors is to use the analysis to establish what they do (the functional elements) rather than the category to which they belong, as argued earlier.

The mapping shown above is sometimes complemented by another tool, AIIM.[48] This enables project teams to think systematically about the level of alignment and interests of the various stakeholders in relation to the specific CV&A changes in view.

Figure A2: ODI AIIM matrix

Key:
Alignment: Do they agree with our approach? Do they agree with our assumptions? Do they want to do the same things that we think need to be done? Are they thinking what we are thinking?

Interest: Are they committing time and money to this issue? Do they want something to happen (whether it is for or against what we propose)? Are they going to events on the subject? Are they publicly speaking about this?

Source: Enrique Mendizabal, Research and Policy in Development, ODI.

In the matrix in Figure A2, there are three dimensions along which the actors are mapped by project teams: the degree of alignment with the proposed project aims, their level of interest in the issue and actors' ability to exert influence (not shown). The argument is that the project team, having mapped the actors in this way, would then devise appropriate strategies to influence these key actors towards a situation where they are both highly aligned and interested in the desired change.

The aim in working with actors in the bottom right-hand corner (highly interested but not aligned) is to have them aligned by finding strategies that can challenge their ideologies and beliefs. The kind of analysis explained above might relate to many different forms of stakeholder analysis carried out in development projects. However, what is different is that, for AIIM, it is important also to analyse actors from the perspective of their underlying ideologies, for instance. This is because ideologies can be hard for people to change because they mostly shape their lives around them, and hence they enforce incentives around ideas they can listen and agree to and ideas they cannot listen and agree to.[49] When these underlying ideologies are known, the strategy for change might be to stop actors of certain perverse ideologies (in relation to the change in view) from participating in the project because they are likely to create obstacles to change because of their perverse incentives.

For actors who are neither interested nor aligned (bottom-left cell), the strategy would be to stimulate their enthusiasm through awareness creation activities, so they can potentially become interested and

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[48] This tool works relatively more easily when participating stakeholders have a good level of education than when they have low education. Our assumption is that it is slightly complex such that the language of 'interests', for example, means only 'positive interests' and does not include 'negative interests' as well.
[49] As Booth (2011) notes, 'ideas may be considered ideological because they involve unthinking, or at least not evidence-based, extrapolation from a particular experience' (p.11).

be involved in action when needed. This would apply to most social accountability initiatives, where not every individual really understands what their engagement is based on at a level of detail (e.g. might not understand the input tracking matrices on budgets to schools). However, the CSOs involved aim to create general awareness of the campaign for change among these community masses in order to generate pressure on duty bearers.

For actors who are highly aligned but not interested (top-left cell), the strategies adopted would be to get them interested through a campaign programme that shows they will achieve success if they work on the project with others. In other words, the aim is to simulate their enthusiasm. Lastly, actors who are highly interested and highly aligned (top-right cell) should be natural allies and collaborators. However, this process of seeking to understand actor interests and alignment with change at a much deeper level is improved when a good analysis is made of actors' observable behaviour(s).

Defining citizen–state engagement dynamics around an issue using OM

Project teams actually discuss actor interests and alignment with change from what they observe in the behaviour of concerned actors and try to make sense of it from either discussions with these actors or interpretations of what is being observed. In term of practice, it is almost natural for citizens and project teams to talk about the behaviour of nurses, teachers, MPs, etc. from the experiences they have formed in working with these public service providers or from what they hear on the radio and other people. This is why almost all social accountability tools (such as CRCs, community score cards, etc.) are about actor behaviour and creating dialogue interfaces with the concerned duty bearers in order to decide on the changes that are required.

What is needed is to understand systematically how behaviour change happens, as a key dynamic in the specific governance context. In the context of various social relationships, actor behaviour is best analysed through OM.[50] The process of actor mapping normally leads to the lead organisations prioritising which of the actors they have a relationship with already and can hence work with in a coalition for change or otherwise bring in during relevant elements of the intervention process. In a well-elaborated workshop with project teams, it is possible even to map out the kind of social network that would be ideal for achieving change, as discussed above. The focus for CV&A projects is then how to facilitate the engagement of these actors on both the side of the community and the side of the government (as shown in the mapping matrix) so that citizen voice results in the desired government actor responses (those

Outcome mapping terms
- Boundary partners: Individuals, groups or organisations with which the programmes interacts directly and which the programme hopes to influence.
- Intentional design: The planning stage, where a programme reaches consensus on the macro-level changes it wants to influence and the strategies to be used.
- Outcome challenge: Description of the ideal changes the programme intends to influence in the behaviour, relationships, activities and/or actions of a boundary partner.
- Progress markers: A set of graduated indicators of changed behaviours of a boundary partner that focus on the depth or quality of the change.

responses that suggest accountability and responsiveness). Actor behaviour is the central area of negotiation and contestation, and is also implicit in the resultant voice and accountability outcomes being looked for (Holland et al, 2009).

OM is best placed as an approach to work systematically with the behaviour of different actors towards a defined change destination. A key innovation of OM is to look at development results as changes in behaviour, actions and relationships of those actors with whom the project is working directly and influencing on the pathway of change (Smutylo, 2005). OM relates very well to the approach to CV&A ToCs discussed above at the level of both principles and practice.

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[50] OM focuses on one specific type of result: outcomes as behavioural change. Outcomes are defined as changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the people, groups and organisations with whom a programme works directly (Earl et al., 2001).

In terms of practice, OM also promotes such ways of working as collaboration or partnership, incremental knowledge transformation among participating actors, ongoing action and reflection and dealing with complexity. All these elements of practice are required for developing ToCs for CV&A projects, as discussed in Section 1 on the main text. OM has hence been used to map relationships of actors with which the programme interacts directly (drawing from the actor maps as discussed above), then articulating the kinds of behaviours and relationships that would be envisaged in order for these actors to contribute effectively to the desired changes.

In using OM, each Mwananchi project team has been systematically exploring the desired behaviours they want of public officials and of civil society, media and individuals that are on the community side of the mapping. OM refers to these desired ideal behaviours as OCs. Interestingly, the vision and mission statements were much easier to develop for actors who had gone through the process of articulating their story of change (as in the layer of analysis discussed in Section 3.2) than in situations where we went directly into discussing vision and mission in an OM training workshop.

The process starts with identifying the actors that project teams think they have a direct relationship with and are in a position to influence. These are the actors ('boundary partners' in OM language) that are in a position either to influence decision-makers directly or to influence others and then get to the ultimate decision-maker for change to happen. In the Mwananchi programme, they are the interlocutors or game-changers who are in the sphere of influence of the project team, with whom there exist opportunities to influence change.

However, the process of setting out what the ideal behaviours (OCs) are for these interlocutors or boundary partners brings up important knowledge for the CV&A project ToC. This is because, although the focus for OM tends to be on setting OC for boundary partners, the focus for a CV&A project is at the same time on why certain actors do not behave in a way such that they can influence other actors in the direction of change desired by the project. This therefore introduces a layer of analysis which aims at observing the behavioural dynamics around interlocutors (or boundary partners) involved in the change process.

The analysis therefore delves into how the projects' boundary partners are currently behaving and why, as well as what these behaviours should be for them to contribute to change (as led by the set ideal behaviours or OCs). This is essentially a process of developing pathways of change around selected actors (picked because of their level of influence on the change process, alignment and interest), while they are located in a specific governance structure which reflects in their daily lives. In essence, it is actor behaviour as located in everyday governance that is the focus of analysis in this layer, as shown in Figure A3.

This layer of analysis, through discussions among participating individuals and organisations, provides rich ethnographic evidence on the behaviours of various key actors on both the community and the government side of the map. Discussion of these behaviours also reveals social practices, ideological narratives, technologies and local strategies for engaging with other actors, including state actors, etc.

It is important to note that what project managers at national headquarters think are OCs and hence PMs for selected boundary partners might be different from what staff at district and grassroots level come up with. This was realised in a discussion with CORD Sierra Leone, for example. Additionally, when these perspectives were validated with the selected boundary partners and other actors that work with them, they found that, not only were some behaviours misconstrued by project managers, but also there were political dimensions surrounding current boundary partners' behaviours which could not be articulated away from the actors and citizens concerned. In other words, there are contextual issues that lie beyond individual boundary actor behaviour and yet are significant for any change in the governance issue in question to happen.

Figure A3: Defining actor engagement dynamics around an issue using OM

		INTERMEDIATE AND LONG TERM RESULTS		
Engagement dynamics around an issue	**Community**	**Lead Organisation**	**Government**	**Engagement dynamics around an issue**
National level	National level e.g. Women's lobby network	National level	National level	National level
Sub-national	Sub-national	Sub-national	Sub-national	Sub-national
Grassroots level	Grassroots level e.g. CBOs	Grassroots level	Grassroots level	Grassroots level

ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES

However, in order to achieve a much deeper sense of actor behaviours and how they are situated in various political contexts, the PEA and OM process needs to make sense of patterns that emerge over time rather than single events. The behaviour of various actors involved in a change process exists or forms into a particular decision logic around the actor and the issue (we are able to say, for example, the when it comes to mining, MPs will support active participation of youths because supportive youth may help MPs to reach communities they cannot reach).

This will help programme stakeholders either to adopt a particular policy change position around working with MPs on mining and develop an influencing strategy or to inform a project implementation team on what programmatic strategies they need to adopt in order to change MPs' behaviour on mining. It is at the level of the prevailing actor decision logics and incentive structures that intervention decisions on the way to achieve the desired CV&A outcomes can be solidly made. This is the main focus of the next stage of analysis.

Exploring patterns of incentives and decision logics of boundary actors and other key actors

This layer of analysis emerges when we start observing the behaviour of selected boundary partners in action, as the project team (e.g. grantee) supports or undertakes the various project actions over time. In using OM, there will be an observation of changes on PMs (in other words indicators of change in moving towards realising outcomes or preconditions in a ToC). From observations being made over several weeks, months or years (time is relative to the kind of project or issue in OM), some conclusions will be drawn on how a particular actor behaves or otherwise makes decisions in relation to a particular issue.

It is possible to track down stories detailing which actions the specific actor undertook and then see the patterns of the decisions they made and why they made them, with what results. It is also possible

to examine the circumstances under which they make the various decisions. It is then possible to form a picture of how the media, for instance, makes decisions on what to put on a community radio station and why and how decisions are made regarding content, under what circumstances, and how it changes from one programme to another. Figure A4 shows how this analysis adds understanding to the previous analyses.

Figure A4: Exploring patterns of incentives and decision logics

The inclusion of 'actor incentives' in this layer of analysis is because, whereas actor incentives are explored in the process of actor mapping and throughout the process of observing the behaviour of actors during project implementation, it is also possible to then form some conclusions as to what the major incentives are around particular decisions. This, too, is a PEA thinking principle. When these observations have been tracked over time in relation to active projects, a pattern of behaviour emerges, as exemplified in the projects that CODI in Uganda has been working on, as shown in Table A2.

In this case, CODI used OM principles to track the changes in behaviour of the actors they had had a close relationship with (resident development commissioners) in their community for delivery of services in the context of Uganda's 2011 general elections. In this case, they formed expected ideal behaviours and relationships for both actors and successfully influenced the behaviour of one and failed with the other. The failure of one of the actors to move towards the ideal behaviour as set out by the community and the CSO meant the loss of votes for the actor.

This is an important process for articulating the consequences of different forms of citizen–state engagement in V&A projects. PEA could shed more light on how the two actors in the case above were reacting to different incentives on the path towards the election, when the result was manifested. It could also show how state actors in certain positions react to various incentives from their constituencies, and how citizens in particular contexts apply sanctions for non-performance.

Table A2: Contrast between a responsive and a non-responsive boundary partner (before 2011 general elections)

Responsive boundary partner	Non-responsive boundary partner
Name: Mwaki Lubende[51]	**Name: Luka Businge**
Position: Chairman LC3 Makulubita sub-county	**Position: Chairman LC3 Katikamu sub-county**
Behaviours at the beginning of the project • Sceptical, curious and slow • Needed information • Feared the project	**Behaviours at the beginning of the project** • Refused the project • Adamant against invitations • Arrogant and abusive • Feared interface meeting with people, etc.
Gradual changing behaviours • Slowly began responding to calls and invitations • Increased attendance at community engagement meetings • Became supportive in mobilising citizens • Began attending planning meetings for project implementation • Began giving advice and guidance	**Gradual changing behaviours** • Hate for the project increased • Feared accounting to the people • Hid himself • Treated CODI as a spying organisation • Tried to de-campaign Mwananchi
Changing results by June 2011 • Was re-elected to office • Acknowledges Mwananchi • Very supportive • Responsive • Is an interlocutor in Mwananchi	**Changing results by June 2011** • Was voted out of office • Failed to convince people as to why he boycotted Mwananchi meetings • Cursing Mwananchi as trouble causer

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[51] These are not the real names as used in the project, in order to avoid publishing information about people without their consent.